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Abstract: The public trust doctrine originated—and has persisted in American
law—as an antimonopoly protection. From the time of its recognition by American courts in the early nineteenth century, the doctrine has protected the public
against private monopolization of natural resources, beginning with tidal waters
and wild animals. Ensuing public trust case law has extended the scope of trust
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protection to other important natural resources, including non-tidal and nonnavigable waters, and land-based resources like parks. Courts are now considering the trust doctrine’s application to the atmosphere. Although there is a considerable body of legal scholarship on the public trust, the doctrine’s antimonopoly core has not been explored. In this Article, we remedy that oversight by
examining the public trust’s justification as an antimonopoly sentiment. Antimonopoly policy is at least as old in American law as the public trust and certainly more politically prominent. Viewing the public trust through the lens of
antimonopoly helps to explain the history and evolution of this doctrine and its
overriding goal of preventing irreversible commitments of natural resources to
private monopolization.

INTRODUCTION
For nearly two hundred years, the public trust doctrine (“PTD”) has
ensured that Americans have access to select natural resources, protecting
those resources from privatization.1 At its core, the PTD prohibits sovereigns from alienating these natural resources2 and requires sovereign protection of trust resources for future public use and enjoyment.3 As this Article
explains, antimonopoly is the essence of the PTD, preventing privatization
of certain resources used by the public, such as tidal waters and wildlife.
Without this limit on alienation many valuable natural resources would, by
now, be privately owned and thus inaccessible to the public.
The roots of the PTD lie in seventeenth-century English political
thought, particularly the writings of John Locke. According to Locke, a person should only be able to acquire property that he could productively use,
“whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.”4
1
See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76–77 (N.J. 1821) (rejecting an attempted landowner
monopolization of tidal oyster beds).
2
See id. (protecting public access to tidal oyster beds); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 477 (1970)
(stating that public trust property “must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held
available for use by the general public”).
3
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
1437, 1466 (asserting that “preservation of access to wildlife lies at the heart of the American
public trust doctrine”); Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 419
(2015) (asserting “a public trust claim inquires as to whether the sovereign is protecting trust assets sufficiently to safeguard the interest of present and future beneficiaries”).
4
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (1690). Locke posited:

Nature did well in setting limits to private property through limits to how much men
can work and limits to how much they need. No man’s labour could tame or appropriate all the land; no man’s enjoyment could consume more than a small part; so
that it was impossible for any man in this way to infringe on the right of another, or
acquire property to the disadvantage of his neighbor . . . .
Id.
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This Lockean sentiment migrated to American political thought, most prominently through Thomas Jefferson’s advocacy of a republic of small landholders and widespread distribution of resources.5 Preserving public rights
to access natural resources, including navigable waters, served Jacksonian
America’s aversion to concentrated wealth and special privileges for elites.6
Later in the nineteenth century, monopolization became a widespread public
concern, as corporations amassed economic and political power and threatened to assert exclusive use of natural resources.7 The rise of concentrated
industrial power in the years following the Civil War led to reform movements like state efforts to regulate railroads and the federal enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and Sherman Antitrust Acts, which
sought to protect the public from the adverse effects of monopolization.8
Promoting widespread public access to navigable waters—the essential
arteries of commerce—developed as part of a larger effort in nineteenthcentury America to resist monopoly power.9 Antimonopoly sentiment produced limits on land acquisition in federal homestead and preemption laws10
and was at the center of the founding of western water law, which rejected
common law riparian water rights because they gave monopoly rights to
5
See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 62 (1968) (“The
small landholders are the most precious part of a state.” (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776)).
6
See Kenneth Lipartito, The Antimonopoly Tradition, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 991, 997 (2013)
(explaining Jacksonian politics as antimonopoly).
7
See Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land Law, 28
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 157 (2016) (describing how antimonopoly policy permeates American
public land law); Lipartito, supra note 6, at 991 (stating that “‘[a]ntimonopoly’ was one of the
most powerful words in the lexicon of nineteenth century America” and outlining the development
of antimonopoly in the business world); Alan Brinkley, The Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal
State: The Case of Thurman Arnold, 80 J. AM. HIST. 557, 557 (1993) (“For more than half a century—from the moment large industrial combinations began to emerge in the last decades of the
nineteenth century to the late years of the Great Depression—the question of monopoly power was
among the central issues of American public life.”).
8
Interstate Commerce Act, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); see Brinkley, supra note 7, at 567 (asserting that the idea of antitrust
was part of “the larger antimonopoly impulse”); Lipartito, supra note 6, at 991, 999 (Eexplaining
that antimonopoly policy “took aim at private actors who sought to advance their own interests
against those of the broad public,” and that “[b]etween 1870 and 1900, the United States went
through a corporation revolution”). See generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust
Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000) (outlining
American antitrust law, beginning with the Sherman Act of 1890).
9
See Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the Public
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461,
489 (1997) (“In an era that did not clearly separate regulatory power from proprietary rights, public ownership of navigable waters was the key to promoting, controlling, and avoiding monopolies
in the most important instrumentality of commerce in mid-nineteenth century America.”).
10
Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 7, at 169–73 (describing the antimonopoly tenets underlying
early American homestead and preemption laws).
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shoreland landowners.11 Public rights to hunt on private, unenclosed lands
were also commonplace, reflecting nineteenth-century America’s preference
for public subsistence hunting over land speculators’ right to exclude, at
least until they invested in fences.12
Nineteenth-century case law established the duty of states to prevent
monopoly control of certain natural resources.13 In 1842, the United States
Supreme Court’s first PTD case disallowed a landowner’s attempted monopoly control of oysters in the Raritan River.14 A half-century later, in
1892, the Court again invoked the PTD to prevent monopolization of Chicago Harbor, invalidating a state grant of lands beneath navigable waters to
a railroad.15 The Court soon added another foundational decision in 1896,
establishing public ownership of wildlife by upholding a state hunting law
that prohibited the transportation of harvested wild birds out of the state.16
As with lands under navigable or tidal waters, the Court concluded that wild
animals were owned by states in “trust for the benefit of all people, and not
. . . for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public
good.”17
By the dawn of the twentieth century, American law had evolved to
recognize sovereign responsibilities to protect public rights in both navigable waters and their underlying beds, as well as in wildlife.18 During the
twentieth century, courts increasingly acknowledged the relative scarcity of
natural resources and the vulnerability of these resources to private monopolization, and in turn responded by extending public trust protection to other

11
See Michael C. Blumm, Antimonopoly and the Radical Lockean Origins of Western Water
Law, 20 HASTINGS W.-NW. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y L. REV. 377, 380–81 (2014) (reviewing DAVID
SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012)).
12
See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. 244, 351 (Const. App. 1818).
13
See infra notes 29–118 (discussing nineteenth-century cases reflecting the PTD’s antimonopoly tenets).
14
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 408, 411, 418 (1842) (holding that the
PTD preempted a landowner from establishing control over oysters in tidal waters).
15
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (deciding that the PTD prevented the
state of Illinois from transferring substantial parts of the bed of Chicago Harbor to a private railroad company); see Sax, supra note 2, at 489 (referring to Illinois Central as “the lodestar in
American public trust law”). See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins
of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 799 (2004) (providing an extensive background on the case).
16
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529, 535 (1896).
17
Id. at 529; see also Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1459–61 (discussing the public trust
in wildlife, beginning with Geer). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the sovereign ownership of wildlife in Horne v. Department of Agriculture. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015); see infra
note 190.
18
See infra notes 38–92, 107–118 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century
public trust protections for tidelands and wildlife).
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resources, including non-navigable-in-fact waters and upland parks.19
Courts also recognized that private monopolization would jeopardize fundamental public uses of natural resources beyond navigation, commerce,
and fishing—the original triad of protected activities.20 Consequently, many
courts have recognized that the PTD protects recreation access, and others
have decided that the doctrine provides environmental protection for trust
resources to benefit future generations.21
Nevertheless, the PTD has to date only had marginal effects on modern
natural resources allocation. Some potential reasons include the fact that the
doctrine’s recognition of public property rights is a counterpoise to an
overwhelming commitment to private rights in American property law.
Moreover, the PTD encourages courts to view skeptically governmental
management of trust resources when that management threatens privatization, which runs against the dominant view of judicial deference to government legislatures and agencies.22 The PTD also is a fractured doctrine, with

19
See infra notes 200–243 and accompanying text (outlining public trust extensions to an
increasing number of natural resources, including non-navigable waters, such as seasonal lakes,
and other resources like upland parks).
20
See infra notes 189–273 and accompanying text (describing important cases that have extended public trust protection beyond uses for navigation, commerce, and fishing).
21
See infra notes 189–273 and accompanying text; see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that “the doctrine has been expanded to
protect additional water-related uses such as swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands”);
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (acknowledging that the
“principal values” the plaintiffs sought to protect were “recreational and ecological—the scenic
views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding
by birds,” and concluding that “protection of these values is among the purposes of the public
trust”). For instance, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained:

[W]e believe that by [the sovereign reservation], a public trust was imposed upon all
the waters of the kingdom. That is, we find the public interest in the waters of the
kingdom was understood to necessitate a retention of authority and the imposition of
a concomitant duty to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future generations and to assure that the waters of our land are put to reasonable and beneficial
uses. This is not ownership in the corporeal sense where the State may do with the
property as it pleases; rather, we comprehend the nature of the State’s ownership as
a retention of such authority to assure the continued existence and beneficial application of the resource for the common good.
658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
22
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer,
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008) (discussing judicial deference for agency interpretations of statutes first established in Chevron).
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decidedly different effects in different states.23 For these reasons, the PTD
has operated below the proverbial radar in many jurisdictions.
But the American population continues to grow, exerting increased
pressure on limited natural resources. As private threats to the environment
become clearer, PTD protection against privatization may become more
prominent. Expansions in the scope of the doctrine in the past occurred in
response to the “felt necessities of the time.”24 Similar felt necessities will
influence its future in the twenty-first century, perhaps strengthening antimonopoly protection for natural resources.
In Part I, this Article links the origins, evolution, and contemporary
significance of the PTD to antimonopoly policy.25 Part I outlines early American public trust cases in which courts originally recognized the relevance
of the PTD in Atlantic tidal waters, but soon extended the doctrine to inland
navigable waters, illustrating the doctrine’s usefulness in protecting against
landowner monopolization of public water resources and wildlife.26 Part II
turns to the modern era, discussing how the PTD has extended and
strengthened antimonopoly protection over natural resources, expanding the
scope of the resources subject to the doctrine and the public uses protected
by it.27 This Article concludes by suggesting that trust advocates would advance PTD case law by encouraging courts to recognize the antimonopoly
impulses underlying the public trust.28
I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:
ANTIMONOPOLIZATION OF PUBLIC RESOURCES
The antimonopoly notion that the public holds rights to access select
natural resources originated in Roman law. As the Roman Emperor Justini23
See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 425 (1989) (“The public trust
doctrine is complicated—there are fifty-one public trust doctrines in this country alone.”).
24
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). According to the famous
dictum of Justice Holmes, the law must evolve:

The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
Id.
25

See infra notes 29–118 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 29–118 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 119–323 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 324–330 and accompanying text.
26
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an explained in a sixth century legal treatise there are “things which are
naturally everybody’s . . . air, flowing water, the sea, and the sea-shore.”29
English law adopted this Roman law concept in the Magna Carta of 1215,
which included a provision promising public uses of navigable and tidal
waters for navigation, commerce, and fishing purposes while restricting
private monopolies that would interfere with those uses.30
In the nineteenth century, the public trust doctrine (“PTD”) crossed the
Atlantic and eventually became a fundamental tenet of American property
law.31 In 1821 the New Jersey Supreme Court first announced the PTD as a
means to guard against private monopolization of certain natural resources,
and as a basis for dividing public and private ownership of waterways.32 By
mid-century, the United States Supreme Court adopted the doctrine as federal law,33 applying it to resolve ownership of submerged lands.34 As the
nineteenth century progressed, the PTD moved upstream to apply to inland
waters that were important to commerce.35 By the turn of the twentieth century, the doctrine not only protected public access to both navigable-in-fact
and tidal waters,36 it also forbade large-scale public conveyance of natural
resources into private hands.37
29

JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 55 (Paul Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 1987).
See HARRISON C. DUNNING, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.01 (3d ed. 2016); see,
e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1894) (stating that water is a public resource “for
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all
the king’s subjects,” and outlining English restrictions of privatization of tidal resources); see also
Sax, supra note 2, at 475–77 (discussing the Roman and English origins of the American public
trust doctrine); Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 465 (identifying navigation, commerce, and fishing as
“traditional purposes” of the public trust doctrine). The California Supreme Court, in City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, credited that history when it stated:
30

The doctrine that the public owns the right to tidelands for purposes such as commerce, navigation and fishing originated in Roman law, which held the public’s
right to such lands to be “illimitable and unrestrainable” and incapable of individual
exclusive appropriation. The English common law developed similar limitations upon private authority over such property: the rights of the public prevailed over the
rights of private persons claiming under tideland grants made by the crown.
606 P.2d 362, 364–65 (Cal. 1980) (internal citation omitted) (quoting The Public Trust in Tidal
Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763 n. 7 (1970)).
31
See generally Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989) (“The public trust is a fundamental doctrine in
American property law and should be recognized much more widely than it is today.”).
32
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76–77 (N.J. 1821).
33
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 418 (1842).
34
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845).
35
See infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth-century inland PTD
cases).
36
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338
(1877); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1851); Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at
418; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76–77.
37
Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892).
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A. Prohibiting Landowner Monopolization of Public Water Resources
A central purpose of the early American PTD was to preserve public
access to navigable-in-fact38 and tidal39 waters and the lands submerged beneath them.40 Historically, navigation and commerce were overlapping concepts,41 because the ability to navigate waterways was essential to commerce before efficient travel overland by railroad and highways emerged.42
Consequently, maintaining public access to navigable waters was a paramount public purpose.

38
See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). In The Daniel Ball, Justice Stephen J. Field explained that rivers are navigable in fact:

when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters
of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction
from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which
commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
Id.
39
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (“[W]e reaffirm our
longstanding precedents which hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership
of all lands under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.”). Tidal lands are lands subject to
the ebb and flow of tides. Id.
40
See Richard R. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647 (1986) (“The public
trust doctrine historically concerned public rights (traditionally, commerce, navigation, and fishing) in navigable waters and their submerged beds. Accordingly, the geographical application of
the doctrine turned on the meaning of navigable water.”) (internal quotations omitted).
41
See DUNNING, supra note 30 (‘“Navigation’ and ‘commerce’ were clearly overlapping
concepts in the historic formulation of the public right. . . . Typically the public right was asserted
for ‘our great passageways of commerce and navigation,’ making clear the centrality of commercial navigation.”); see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP.
L.J. 235, 239 (2003) (“Transportation is . . . a fundamental component of economic growth. It is
the infrastructure foundation upon which the rest of the economy is built.”).
42
See LOUIS C. HUNTER, STEAMBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS: AN ECONOMIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL HISTORY 3–4 (1994) (Describing how sea travel was the preferred method of
transportation during the eighteenth century, because “[i]n America, roads were especially poor,
the cost of carriage high, and the time of trips very slow. Except to serve local needs highway
transport played a minor role in commercial intercourse. Rivers made up the principal inland waterways . . . .”); Lazarus, supra note 40, at 636 (“Commerce was primarily waterborne; the rivers
served as highways for pioneers and supplied power for industry. Accordingly, cities and towns
invariably lined major waterways, and natural ports were a prerequisite to developing a major
metropolitan area.”); Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 431–33 (Describing the significance of major
rivers to early American transportation “[t]o the early settlers, the rivers furnished paths of exploration and avenues for the fur trade and log floats. Due to the density of the forests and the difficulty of road construction, the watercourses afforded logical areas for settlement. Fishing was
significant, both for commercial and subsistence purposes.”).
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In 1821, in Arnold v. Mundy the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a
landowner’s attempt to monopolize oyster harvesting on tidal flats in the
Raritan River, a decision that upheld that state’s sovereign ownership of
tidal waters and the lands beneath them.43 Two decades later, in Martin v.
Waddell’s Lessee, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that New Jersey held the submerged lands in the Raritan River in trust for its citizens.44
In so doing, the Court extended states’ sovereign ownership of submerged
tidal lands to all original states and, shortly thereafter, to all states.45 By the
turn of the twentieth century, the Court recognized state public trust obligations in inland, navigable-in-fact waters, protecting those waters from private monopolization as well.46
1. Preventing Monopolization of Wildlife Resources in Tidal Waters
The earliest American public trust cases protected shellfish harvesting
from private monopolization in tidal waters. The 1821 decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold established the state’s sovereign
ownership of tidal waters in the Raritan River and the lands underlying
those waters.47 Two decades later, in 1842, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the New Jersey court’s ruling and ratified public access rights to
the Raritan River and Bay.48 The Raritan River is therefore the homeland of
the American PTD.
Arnold, which laid the foundation for the American PTD, rejected a
landowner’s attempted monopolization of oysters in the Raritan River.49
Robert Arnold, who owned land adjacent to the river, claimed an exclusive
right to harvest adjacent oyster beds based on a chain of title dating to a
grant from the Duke of York, who, in turn, had acquired title in the seventeenth century from his brother, Charles II, King of England.50 After purchasing a farm adjacent to the river, Arnold planted oysters in the riverbed
below the high water mark and then drove off would-be oyster harvesters.51
43

6 N.J.L. at 78.
41 U.S. at 417–18 (disagreeing with the plaintiff that Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 93, was decided in
error, and instead upholding the reasoning in Arnold).
45
Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 224 (extending sovereign rights to the submerged lands of new
states under the “equal footing” doctrine); see infra notes 80–83 (discussing this case).
46
See infra notes 84–92 (discussing the march of the PTD inland).
47
6 N.J.L. at 78. Actually, a decade before the Arnold decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recognized public rights in the inland Susquehanna River in Carson v. Blazer. 2 Binn. 475
(Pa. 1810); see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
48
Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 417.
49
6 N.J.L. at 78.
50
Id. at 45–46, 65–66.
51
Id. at 65–66. Arnold’s predecessor, Coddington, had also attempted to assert an exclusive
right to the oysters, “but the people had always disputed that right, had entered upon [the oyster
44
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To test the legality of Arnold’s assertion of an exclusive right to the oysters,
Benajah Mundy led a small fleet upriver and harvested some of them.52
As anticipated, Arnold filed suit against Mundy.53 At trial, Mundy
claimed that Arnold’s exclusive title extended only to the high water mark,54
and that his fleet had lawfully taken oysters under the public’s right to harvest a publicly owned natural resource.55 The New Jersey trial court found
Mundy’s assertions persuasive and held in his favor; Arnold appealed.56
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision. Chief
Justice Andrew Kirkpatrick agreed with the lower court that Arnold’s title
ended at the high water mark, and thus did not extend to the riverbed that
provided a habitat for the oysters.57 Kirkpatrick differentiated navigable
waters, such as the tidal Raritan River, from streams and rivers “where the
tide neither ebbs nor flows.”58 Although private title for non-tidal waters
reached the middle of the water’s channel, he announced that upland title
adjacent to navigable waters ended at the high water mark.59 Consequently,
the public had a right to access the bed of the navigable Raritan River and
to harvest the attached oysters, thus Arnold had no right to exclude the public.60
flats], and taken oysters from it, when they pleased, and if opposed by Coddington . . . the strongest usually prevailed.” Id. at 65.
52
Id. at 66. Kirkpatrick reported that Mundy had taken oysters “merely with a view of trying
the plaintiff’s pretended right, and not with a view of injuring the [oyster] bed, or taking the oysters further than was necessary for this purpose.” Id. at 66.
53
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 65.
54
The high water mark is “not . . . a physical mark made upon the ground by the waters; it
means the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides.” Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City
of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935). The ordinary high tide is “the mean high tide line,” which
is “a mean of all the high tides.” Id. at 26.
55
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 66.
56
Id. at 14–15.
57
Id. at 10.
58
Id. The court found:
[A] grant of land to a subject or citizen, bounded upon a fresh water stream or river,
where the tide neither ebbs nor flows, extends to the middle of the channel of such
river; but that a grant bounded upon a navigable river, or other water, where the tide
does ebb or flow, extends to the edge of the water only, that is to say, to high water
mark, when the tide is high, and to low water mark, when the tide is low, but it extends no farther.
Id. Kirkpatrick proceeded to explain that “[t]he intermediate space . . . between the high water and
low water mark, may be exclusively appropriated by the owner of the adjacent land, by building
thereon docks, wharves, storehouses, salt-pans, or other structures which exclude the reflow of the
water.” Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 76–77. Kirkpatrick ruled:
[B]y the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all the social rights [and]
by the civil law, which formerly governed almost the whole civilized world [and] by
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Consistent with his determination that the riverbed was publicly
owned, Justice Kirkpatrick decided that the King’s grant to the Duke of
York was not merely a private proprietary estate but also a grant of sovereign powers.61 Because the King, as sovereign, could not claim exclusive
title to navigable waterways, he could not grant more than he possessed,
since that would interfere with public rights.62 Therefore, a successor to the
title of the King had no power grant to a landowner like Arnold the right to
exclude the public from use of beds of the Raritan River and Bay.63 Moreover, the state of New Jersey succeeded to the King’s sovereign powers and
duties upon statehood.64
According to Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, there were three kinds of property: (1) private property, owned by individuals; (2) public property, which
the sovereign may grant to private individuals, in the service of public
good; and (3) common property, including “the air, the running water, the
sea, the fish, and the wild beasts,” held by the sovereign for public use.65
Because it would be impractical for common property to “be vested in all
the people,” ownership is in the sovereign “to be held, protected, and regu-

the common law of England . . . the navigable rivers in which the tide land under the
water, for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all other uses of the water and its products (a few things excepted), are
common to all the citizens, and . . . each [citizen] has a right to use them according
to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use . . . . [T]he property, indeed, strictly speaking is vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in him, not for
his own use, but for the use of the citizen; that is, for [the citizen’s] direct and immediate enjoyment.
Id.
61
62

Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 34. The court explained:
It is manifest [the king] could give to the duke of York, and his assigns, no greater
right and power over the navigable waters here than he himself would have possessed; and, if the words of the grant are more extensive, all beyond his legitimate
right is absolutely void. As he could only possess a right in these navigable waters,
subject to the common right of fishery of the inhabitants, which was unalienable, the
duke of York, and all claiming under him, would take the right of the king, subject
to the same restriction.

Id.
63

Id.
Id. at 13. Kirkpatrick clarified by stating that the royal rights that had passed to the state of
New Jersey, in its sovereign capacity, and therefore the state “cannot make a direct and absolute
grant, divesting all the citizens of their common right; such a grant, or a law authorizing such a
grant, would be contrary to the great principles of our constitution, and never could be borne by a
free people.” Id. at 78.
65
Id. at 71.
64
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lated for the common use and benefit.”66 Subsequent decisions have
agreed.67
Two decades later, the United States Supreme Court adopted Justice
Kirkpatrick’s reasoning in Waddell’s Lessee, another controversy over access to oysters in the Raritan River and Bay, thereby extending the public
rights recognized in Arnold to all original thirteen states.68 In Waddell’s Lessee, a lessee of William Waddell claimed title to a 100-acre tract of oyster
beds below the high water mark in Raritan Bay, again based on grants from
King Charles to his brother, the Duke of York, in 1664 and 1674 that conveyed “all the lands, islands, soils, rivers, harbors, mines, minerals, quarries,
woods, marshes, waters, lakes, fishings, hawkings, and fowlings,” among
other things.69 Concurrently, Merrit Martin held a leasehold in those oyster
beds under an 1824 New Jersey statute.70 To establish exclusive access to
the oysters, Waddell’s lessee sued to eject Martin, in what appeared to be an
effort to get the New Jersey courts to reconsider the Arnold rule or have the
Supreme Court overturn it.71 This effort bore fruit at trial when a jury ruled
in favor of Waddell’s lessee, finding that the claim based on the King’s land
grant was superior to the subsequent state lease.72
Although the United States Supreme Court also recognized the royal
charter, it reversed the lower court, stating that New Jersey had sovereign
ownership of the submerged lands because the state was the successor to the
English Crown.73 Therefore, Martin’s harvesting lease from the state was

66
Id. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick elaborated on the concept of common property by stating that
the king could not

appropriate it to himself, or to the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of it
is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary power; and that, in theory at least, could not exist in a free government, such as England
has always claimed to be.
Id. at 72–73.
67
See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of PTD case law).
68
See Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 382. The Court opined:
There is no language in this royal grant that will pass the sea and its arms, as private
property . . . . We contend, first, that the sea and its arms were part of the regalia or
prerogative rights of the crown. And secondly, that they could not, upon a sound
construction of this charter, pass as private property, to the Duke, in his private capacity.
Id. at 382.
69
Id. at 370.
70
Id. at 408.
71
See id. at 407.
72
See id. at 405.
73
Id. at 417.
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superior to other land ownership claims.74 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney considered the nature of the King’s original rights,75 and
whether those rights changed when they passed to the Duke of York, and
eventually to Waddell, as the landowner.76 Scrutinizing the royal charters,
Taney concluded that “the sea and its arms are peculiarly and pre-eminently
in the king in respect to their uses; all of which, at common law, are public,
and they are held by the king for the public benefit.”77 He decided that the
Duke and his successors, Waddell and his lessee, merely stood in place of
the King, meaning the private ownership was subject to the public’s prior
right of access; thus, Martin had no right to exclude the public from using
the submerged lands.78 Like Arnold, Waddell’s Lessee prevented private
monopolization of public resources in tidal waterways.79
Three years after it decided Waddell’s Lessee, the United States Supreme Court extended state sovereign ownership of submerged tidal lands
to all states, not just those formed from British colonies, in a dispute over
rights to submerged lands in Mobile Bay, Alabama.80 Because all new states
were admitted to the Union on an “equal footing” with the original states,81
74

See id. The Court concluded that the Duke had later surrendered governmental power to the
Crown, and that “when the people of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and
took into their own hands the powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before
belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the
state.” Id.
75
Id. at 409. The Court stated:
We do not propose to meddle with the point which was very much discussed at the
bar, as to the power of the king, since Magna Charta, to grant to a subject a portion
of the soil covered by the navigable waters of the kingdom, so as to give him an
immediate and exclusive right of fishery, either for shell-fish or floating fish, within
the limits of his grant.
Id. at 410.
76
Id. at 411. According to the Court, an essential question was whether, in the Duke’s hands,
the public resources were intended to be a trust for the common use of the new community about
to be established; or private property to be parceled out and sold to individuals, for his own benefit? And in deciding a question like this, we must not look merely to the strict technical meaning
of the words of the letters-patent. The laws and institutions of England, the history of the times,
the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction given to it, and the usages under it, for
the century and more which has since elapsed, are all entitled to consideration and weight. Id.
77
Id. at 383. But public waterways are not reserved exclusively for public use. As the Supreme Court observed in Waddell’s Lessee, natural forces, such as alluvion (i.e., an increase in an
area of land due to sediment deposited by a river), or practices such as wharfing out may produce
private rights. Id.
78
Id. at 412–13.
79
See id. at 417; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 58.
80
Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230.
81
Id. at 224 (“Whenever the United States shall have fully executed these trusts, the municipal sovereignty of the new states will be complete, throughout their respective borders, and they,
and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all respects whatever.”). See generally
James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust
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the Court in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan ruled that the new states owned
submerged tidal lands due to an implicit conveyance in their statehood
acts.82 Pollard’s Lessee therefore recognized public trust rights and accompanying antimonopoly protection in tidal submerged lands in all states.83
2. Extending Antimonopoly Protection to Inland Waters
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Waddell’s Lessee and Pollard’s Lessee might have been interpreted to confine public rights to coastal areas
subject to tidal influence, leaving the vast interior of the American continent, with its large rivers and lakes, subject to private monopolization.84 But
in the early nineteenth century state courts began the process of enlarging
the scope of public rights in waterways to include those waters that were
navigable-in-fact. For example, in 1810, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled in Carson v. Blazer that a riparian landowner had “no exclusive right
to fish in the Susquehanna River immediately in front of his lands . . . [because] the right to fisheries in [a large freshwater river not subject to tidal
influence] is vested in the state, and open to all.”85 In 1826, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared that navigable waters “invariably and
exclusively belong to the public.”86 Three decades later, in 1856, the Iowa
Supreme Court concluded that actual navigability, not the presence of the
tides, was the defining characteristic of public waters.87
These decisions were emblematic of the PTD’s inland march. The
United States Supreme Court began to ratify this expansion of public rights
in 1851 in The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, in which the Court upheld a congressional extension of admiralty jurisdiction to non-tidal waters used for

Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 88 (1997) (asserting that the PTD originated in part
from early equal footing cases).
82
44 U.S. at 228–29; see Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 443–47 (discussing the origins of the
equal footing doctrine). In Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, the Court declared:
Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory
within her limits, subject to the common law, to the same extent that Georgia possessed it before she ceded it to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is
to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the
original states . . . .
44 U.S. at 228–29.
83
See Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230; see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 1 (“The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the constitution have the same rights as the original
states in the tide waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions.”).
84
See Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 230; Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 418.
85
2 Binn. at 477–78 (concluding that it would be “highly unreasonable” to limit the scope of
navigability to tidal waters).
86
Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268, 271 (1826).
87
McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 30 (1856).
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commerce.88 In that case, involving the advent of steamships that opened
inland waters to commerce, the Court explained that in the United States
there were “thousands of miles of public navigable water, including lakes
and rivers in which there is no tide.”89 Consequently, in a land with numerous inland waters capable of supporting commercial navigation, the tidal
limit on the public rights in waterways inherited from England was a poor
fit.90 A quarter-century later, in 1877, in Barney v. City of Keokuk, a nonadmiralty case, the Court extended public rights to navigable-in-fact waters,
refusing to draw a distinction between tidal and non-tidal waters for the
purposes of navigation and sovereign ownership.91 By the turn of the twentieth century, American courts thus had expanded the reach of public rights
to include not just coastal waters subject to tidal influence but also all waters that served or could serve as commercial highways.92
B. Restraining Privatization of Public Trust Resources
A second fundamental antimonopoly characteristic of the American PTD
at the turn of the twentieth century was a restriction on privatizing trust resources. This restraint on alienation was the product of the United States Supreme Court’s 1892 opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, in which
the Court invalidated a legislative attempt to privatize most of Chicago Harbor, hinging its decision on the PTD.93 Four years later, in 1896, the Court
upheld a state’s right to restrict privatization of wildlife in Geer v. Connecticut, concluding that wild animals were part of the public trust.94
88

The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 457.
Id.
90
See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine—A Twenty-First Century Concept, 16
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 105, 105–06 (2010) (“[T]he English standard of navigability did not fit the American continent, with its great rivers and lakes. Thus, over a centuryand-a-half ago, navigability—central to the historic public trust doctrine, evolved from a coastal to
an inland, upriver concept.”); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative
Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 196 (1980) (“The opening of the Northwest Territory and the purchase of Louisiana presented us with vastly different
waters than the seas and rivers of England. Unrestricted use of the inland waterways was a necessity for the development of the country.”).
91
94 U.S. at 338; see also Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 161
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (“Although watercourse sovereignty ran with the tidewaters in England, an
island country, in America the doctrine was extended to navigable inland watercourses as well.”
(citing Barney, 94 U.S. at 324)).
92
Public rights in navigable-in-fact waters became so well accepted during the twentieth
century that later there was some question about whether the navigable-in-fact test had eclipsed
the tidal waters test. In 1988, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court clarified
that tidal waters that were not subject to navigation were in fact public trust waters. 484 U.S. at
478.
93
146 U.S. 387, 458, 464 (1892).
94
161 U.S. at 529, 535.
89
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1. Restraining Privatization of Water Resources
The landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad involved a dispute arising from an attempt by the Illinois legislature to privatize most of Chicago
Harbor.95 In 1869, the Illinois legislature enacted the Lake Front Act, which
granted Illinois Central Railroad roughly 1,000 acres of Lake Michigan’s
submerged lands.96 Four years later, amid widespread allegations of corruption, the legislature revoked the grant.97 The railroad objected to the revocation, maintaining that the conveyance had transferred vested property rights
that were not subject to legislative revocation without compensation.98
The Court upheld the legislature’s 1873 revocation of the grant in a
majority opinion by Justice Stephen J. Field who decided that the PTD
made the state’s submerged lands largely inalienable.99 In a decision that
Professor Joe Sax characterized as the “lodestar” of the PTD, Justice Field
stated, “A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a state has
never been adjudged to be within the state’s legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face,
as subject to revocation.”100 The state can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested—like navigable waters
and the soils underneath them—than it can abdicate its police power in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.101 Consequently, the Court held that “[t]here can be no irrepealable [sic] contract of
95

Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458, 464. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15
(claiming that the 1869 grant was not simply a scandalous legislative grant but was the product of
four decades of political wrangling between the city of Chicago, the state of Illinois, and businesses like the railroad and suggesting that downstate economic interests favored the grant because the
1869 legislation entitled them to share in fees paid by the railroad).
96
Lake Front Act, 1869.11, Laws 245 (repealed by Act of April 15, 1873, 1873.11, Laws
115); Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 454.
97
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 463.
98
Id. at 433–34.
99
See id. at 458, 464. The decision was unclear as to whether the grant to the railroad was
voidable by the legislature or void at the outset, but the ambiguity did not affect the outcome,
since the Illinois legislature had revoked its grant. See id. Subsequent decisions, however, indicate
that such a grant is void, at least in Illinois. See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 450 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (enjoining a conveyance to Loyola University of
eighteen acres of submerged Lake Michigan lands); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360
N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976) (striking down a conveyance of 194 submerged acres of Lake Michigan to
U.S. Steel).
100
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453; Sax, supra note 2, at 489. Similarly, Professor Charles
Wilkinson called Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, “the leading case on the traditional public
trust doctrine.” Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 450; see Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.
101
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. The size of the grant concerned the Court, with Justice
Field remarking that it was “as large as that embraced by the merchandise docks along the Thames
at London; is much larger than that included in the famous docks and basins at Liverpool; is twice
the size of the port at Marseilles, and nearly, if not quite, equal to the pier area along the water
front at New York.” Id. at 454.
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property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was
bound to hold and manage it.”102
Although the Court concluded that the grant of most of Chicago Harbor violated the PTD, the Illinois Central opinion did not prohibit all alienation of public trust resources. The Court suggested two circumstances under
which the public’s right to use navigable water could be extinguished: a
sovereign may alienate a public trust resource: where doing so (1) furthered
the purposes of the public trust,103 or (2) did not substantially impair public
use of the remaining public trust resources.104 As a result, states retain some
discretion in managing their trust resources, although many impose a pre102
Id. at 460. Justice Field did not discuss the origins of Illinois’ fiduciary obligations concerning certain public resources. See id. Arguably, the Court’s conclusion and assertions about the
public trust were based on federal common law recognition of a doctrine the United States inherited from England. See id.; Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal
Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 130
(2010) (so arguing). But see William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive
Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 700 (2012) (Criticizing as “notoriously murky . . . the foundations of the rule that prevented Illinois from conveying a large part of the Chicago lakefront to a
railroad corporation. That decision has been described as resting on state common law, federal
common law, the federal navigational servitude, and an inchoate concept of inalienable sovereignty.”). In the more than one hundred years since Illinois Central, the Court has not clarified whether the public trust doctrine originates in state or federal law, although it has proclaimed in dicta
that the decision in that case was “necessarily a statement of Illinois law.” Appleby v. City of N.
Y., 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926); see Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 459; see also Phillips Petroleum Co.,
484 U.S. at 475 (states may “define the limits of lands they hold in public trust and recognize
private rights in such lands as they see fit.”). In 2012, in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, the Supreme Court explained:

Pursuant to [the equal footing] doctrine, upon its date of statehood, a State gains title
within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable. It may allocate and govern
those lands according to state law subject only to the United States’ power “to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce.”
132 S. Ct. 1215, 1219 (2012) (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 1 (1935)).
103
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452. The Court explained:
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over
them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and
piers therein, for which purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands;
and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be
made to the grants.
Id.
104

Id. The Court also announced:

It is grants of parcels of lands under navigable waters that may afford foundation for
wharves, piers, docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels
which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust to the public
upon which such lands are held by the state.
Id.
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sumption against alienation of public resources, requiring clear legislative
intent to accomplish such alienation.105 As the United States Supreme Court
stated, “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be
lost.”106 Thus, before the turn of the twentieth century, American public trust
case law established a preference for public ownership and control of key
natural resources and an aversion to private monopolies.
2. Restraining Privatization of Wildlife
By the end of the nineteenth century, the PTD had evolved to restrict
privatization of resources beyond navigable waters. For example, in addition to protecting public access to waterways, both Arnold and Waddell’s
Lessee preserved public rights to harvest oysters on commonly owned submerged lands.107 Then, four years after its decision in Illinois Central Railroad, the United States Supreme Court ratified state claims of sovereign
ownership of all wildlife as part of the public trust.108
In 1896, in Geer v. Connecticut, the Court ratified state claims of sovereign ownership of all wildlife, which the Court recognized as part of the
public trust.109 Accordingly, the Court upheld Connecticut’s right to restrict
privatization of wild animals.110 The state charged Edward Geer with violating a state law that criminalized the transport of certain bird species across
state lines.111 Although Geer’s possession of the birds was legal, because he
had shot them during hunting season, the statute prohibited their out-of105

See, e.g., Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 343 (Fla. 1986)
(explaining that state sovereignty lands “cannot be conveyed without clear intent and authority”);
Gwathmey v. State, 464 S.E.2d 674, 686 (N.C. 1995) (stating that “the presumption arising under
the public trust doctrine that the General Assembly did not convey title free of public trust rights
has not been rebutted and prevails in this case”); Cmty. Nat’l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195, 1198
(Vt. 2001) (rejecting alienation where “the record contains no clear expression of a legislative
intent to abandon the public trust interest in the land in question”).
106
Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.
107
See Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. at 418; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 76–77; see supra notes 43–78
and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
108
See Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (stating that states’ sovereign ownership of wildlife “is to be
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a
prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of
private individuals as distinguished from the public good”); Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 459 (stating that “soil under navigable waters being held by the people of the state in trust for the common
use”). See generally Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1466 (discussing the public trust in wildlife and providing a compendium of state wildlife trusts).
109
See Geer, 161 U.S. at 529 (stating that states’ sovereign ownership of wildlife “is to be
exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a
prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of
private individuals as distinguished from the public good”).
110
See id. at 519, 529.
111
Id. at 521.
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state transport.112 The state successfully prosecuted Geer in the lower
courts, and he appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that
Connecticut’s law violated the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause.113
The Court rejected Geer’s argument and affirmed the state conviction
in an opinion by Justice Edward White, who recounted “numerous” examples of judicial recognition of the states’ right to regulate wild animals,114
explaining that “the right to reduce animals ferae naturae to possession has
[long] been subject to the control of the law-giving power.”115 As with lands
under navigable and tidal waters, Geer traced the state’s ownership of wild
animals to rights transferred from the King of England, and consequently
clarified that wild animals are a public trust resource.116
Like navigable waters, states own wildlife in their sovereign capacity,
in trust for the people. At the turn of the twentieth century, Geer expanded
the PTD beyond the limits of navigable waters, recognizing wildlife as a
trust resource.117 Thus states may restrict privatization of wild animals, including preventing wildlife harvests or transportation. Like Illinois Central
Railroad, Geer was fundamentally an antimonopoly decision.118
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: EXPANDING
ANTIMONOPOLY PROTECTION
Like the common law from which it emerged, the public trust doctrine
(“PTD”) continued to evolve in the twentieth century, changing in response

112

Id. at 521–22.
Id.
114
See id. at 528.
115
Id. 522.
116
Id. at 527, 529. Justice White stated:
113

[T]he power or control lodged in the state, resulting from . . . common ownership, is
to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the government as distinct from
the people, or for the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public
good.
Id. Justice White also decided that transactions occurring within Connecticut’s borders were not
interstate commerce under the U.S. Constitution because he concluded that items entering the food
supply could be the object of commerce only with the state’s consent. Id. at 534–35. The Supreme
Court reversed part of the opinion in 1979 in Hughes v. Oklahoma. 441 U.S. 322, 335, 338 (1979)
(ruling that Oklahoma could not ban exports of native minnows because wildlife was commerce,
subject to the limits imposed by the Commerce Clause).
117
See 161 U.S. at 529 (“the power or control lodged in the state, resulting from . . . common
ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people”).
118
See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text (discussing antimonopoly in Illinois Central).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811969

20

Environmental Affairs

[Vol. 44:1

to public values, needs, and uses of natural resources.119 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained in 1972, “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all
common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but should
be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”120
Over the last two centuries, the PTD has grown in several somewhat
surprising ways, extending antimonopoly protection beyond tidelands and
beyond traditional public uses while reinforcing the principle of nonalienation of natural resources. First, the PTD has expanded to protect uses
beyond the traditional triad of commerce, navigation, and fishing. Some
states now recognize recreation and ecological use as trust purposes, transforming the doctrine into a vehicle to, for example, protect wetlands and
preserve lake and river waters in place.121 Second, courts have recognized
additional trust resources, including non-navigable waters and upland resources like parks.122 Third, state courts have continued to recognize restraints on privatization of public trust resources.123 Fourth, by the turn of
119
See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“The public uses to which
tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the [PTD] the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of
utilization over another.”) (internal citation omitted). See generally Michael C. Blumm, Public
Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 579 (1989) (asserting that the public trust doctrine is “chameleonlike” because courts apply it to create a variety of different types of remedies); Bertram C. Frey &
Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surfaceways and Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 911–12 (2007) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is an “inherently dynamic” and evolving aspect of the common law).
120
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)
(ensuring public access to dry sandy portions of a municipal beach).
121
See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 719, 728
(Cal. 1983) (acknowledging that the “principal values” the plaintiffs sought to protect were “recreational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its shore, the purity of the air, and the
use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds,” and concluding that “protection of these values is
among the purposes of the public trust”); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365
(Cal. 1980) (Noting early disputes concerning public interest in tidelands “encompass[ed] navigation, commerce and fishing, the permissible range of public uses is far broader, including the right
to hunt, bathe or swim, and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state as ecological
units for scientific study.”); Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to
include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.”).
122
See Pullen v. Ullmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60–61 (Alaska 1996) (concluding that the PTD applies
to salmon and other fish); In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d
409, 453, 488 (Haw. 2000) (deciding that groundwater is a public trust resource); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966) (holding that privatization of a
substantial part of a public park violated the state’s public trust doctrine).
123
See, e.g., Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 443–45
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (relying on the PTD to prevent a state’s grant of 18.5 acres of lakebed for development of an athletic facility); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158,
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the twenty-first century, a number of PTD decisions reflected efforts to protect trust resources from environmental degradation.124 As with early public
trust case law, these developments seek to prevent private monopolization
of important natural resources.
A. Protecting Public Resource Uses Beyond Commerce,
Navigation, and Fishing
The PTD traditionally supplied antimonopoly protection for activities
in commerce, navigation, and fishing.125 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained, “[t]he original purpose of the doctrine was to preserve for the use
of all the public natural water resources for navigation and commerce, waterways being the principal transportation arteries of early days, and for
fishing, an important source of food.”126 In recent decades, state courts have
expanded the scope of activities covered by the PTD beyond that triad to
protect public recreation and ecological preservation under the doctrine,
expanding its antimonopoly effect.127

166–173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the Arizona legislature’s grant of riverbed lands to a
private owner on PTD grounds); People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773, 780–81
(Ill. 1976) (relying on Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), to prevent conveyance of submerged lands).
124
See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 708 (2006). According to Professor Klass:
These more recent public trust decisions show how the environmental movement of
the 1970s began to influence state courts’ conceptions of the role of the common
law public trust doctrine in our modern world. Indeed, the supreme courts of California, Wisconsin and Illinois and lower courts in other jurisdictions issued strong
public trust opinions in the 1970s that expressly recognized society’s growing concern regarding environmental issues and the need . . . .
Id.; see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward and Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 80–91 (2010) (discussing the emergence of ecologically related PTDs in western states).
125
See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements are traditionally defined in terms of
navigation, commerce and fisheries.”).
126
Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 52.
127
Id. at 54 (“We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth century,
the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing,
but extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”);
see infra notes 128–188 and accompanying text (discussing this expansion to recreation and ecological function).
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1. Recreation
A number of states have extended PTD antimonopoly protection to
recreational uses of natural resources.128 In 1893, Minnesota became the
first state to embrace recreation as a public trust purpose.129 In Lamprey v.
Metcalf, private parties claimed that they owned the bed of a dry lake, having acquired it under federal patents, and that because the lakes were not
used for navigable commerce, they were not subject to public rights.130 The
state of Minnesota objected, maintaining that it owned the former lakebed
in its sovereign capacity, and that private ownership extended only to the
uplands above the lake’s original borders.131 The trial court found for the
private parties, and the state appealed.132
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the landowners owned the dry lakebeds, but it also decided that lakebeds were subject to
the public trust if they were suitable for recreation, not just navigable commerce.133 According to the court, thousands of other lakes in the state also
had receding lake levels and might also become dry.134 Many of the lakes
had not been used for commercial navigation, but they supported various
public recreational uses, including boating and bathing.135 Although ac-

128
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965(14) (2016) (defining “navigable waters” to include
waters that may be used for “floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating,
trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes”);
State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (deciding that a watercourse can be considered
navigable due solely to recreational use); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 448 (stating that “the trust traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing” but
also recognizing “a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating, and
scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes”); Kootenai Envt’l Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092–93 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust
purpose); J.P. Furlong Enter., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D.
1988) (extending public trust protection to bathing, swimming, fishing, and irrigation); Morse v.
Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 1978) (stating that public trust protection
extends to recreation); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987) (citing Wilbour v.
Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232 (Wash. 1969)) (public trust rights include navigation, fishing, swimming,
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes); Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761,
768 (Wis. 1972) (“The active public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin in respect to navigable
waters requires the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and preserve those
waters for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.”); Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 186
N.W.2d 290, 296 (Wis. 1971) (purposes of trust “include all public uses of water”); see also Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 465 (discussing extension of the public trust beyond the traditional triad
of uses).
129
Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143–44 (Minn. 1893).
130
Id. at 1140.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1144.
134
Id.
135
Id. 1143.
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knowledging that private parties acquired ownership of the lakebed,136 the
court agreed with the state that waters were subject to the public trust, even
if they were used only for recreation.137 As the court explained:
Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes of this state, are not
adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent
for, commercial navigation; but they are used—and as population
increases, and towns and cities are built up in their vicinity, will
be still more used-by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and
even city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes which
cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all
these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of
navigability, would be a great wrong upon the public for all time,
the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.138
Lamprey thus extended public rights to all waters suited for public recreation.139
Many other state courts have since extended the PTD’s antimonopoly
protection to waters used for recreation.140 Montana offers a good example.
In 1984, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision prohibiting a private
landowner and his oil company from excluding the public from recreating
on some seven miles of the Dearborn River.141 The trial court held that the
public had a right to use the waters and streambed of the river up to the high
136

Id. at 1144. The Lamprey court explained:

[S]o long as these lakes are capable of use for boating, even for pleasure, they are
navigable, within the reason and spirit of the common-law rule. When the waters of
any of them have so far receded or dried upon to be no longer capable of any beneficial use by the public, they are no longer public waters, and their former beds, under
the principles already announced, would become the private property of the riparian
owners.
Id.
137

Id. at 1143.
Id. (emphasis added).
139
Id.
140
See, e.g., Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to include
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or
other purposes.”); Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54 (recognizing public recreational rights
to beaches and the water they abut); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Or. 1936) (acknowledging the public right to recreational use of waters); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P.
437, 442 (Or. 1918) (recognizing public rights in “sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating . . . and other public uses which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated” (quoting
Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143)).
141
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 169–70 (Mont. 1984).
138
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water mark, because the river was navigable-in-fact at the time of statehood
the state owned the streambeds.142 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed,
agreeing that the Dearborn River was navigable under federal law.143 But
the court also indicated that the PTD extended beyond waters in which the
state owned the bed, adopting a recreational-use test like that first announced by the Minnesota court in Lamprey:
The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines their availability for recreational use by the public. Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If the waters are
owned by the State and held in trust for the people by the State, no
private party may bar the use of those waters by the people.144
Interpreting the state constitution to codify the PTD, the court concluded
that the private landowner could not exclude the public from recreational
use of the river.145
One month later, in Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, the Montana Supreme Court confirmed its extension of the PTD to
recreational uses.146 A citizen group filed suit against a private owner, Lowell Hildreth, who had attempted to exclude members of the public from
floating on a stream that ran through his property.147 The trial court enjoined
Hildreth from interfering with floaters, deciding that the stream was suitable
for recreation, and therefore subject to Montana’s public trust.148 Hildreth
appealed, but the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines whether the
waters can be so used,”149 and concluding that because the stream was suit142

Id. at 172. The district court also dismissed Curran’s counterclaim for inverse condemnation. Id. at 171.
143
Id. at 172
144
Id. at 170; see also Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004) (discussing cases
from several other states and joining those concluding that public recreational rights were independent of private ownership of the bed of the body of water.). On the pleasure-boat test for navigability, see DUNNING, supra note 30, § 32.03.
145
Curran, 682 P.2d at 170–71 (quoting the Montana Constitution as providing that “[a]l
surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law”).
146
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
147
Id. at 1090.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1091. Curiously, the court was reluctant to adopt the so-called “pleasure-boat test,”
used in other jurisdictions. Id.; see DUNNING, supra note 30, § 32.03. Instead, the court held that a
body of water is subject to the state’s PTD if it is suitable for recreation. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at
1091. In its holding, the Montana Supreme Court explained:
The [trial court] found the Beaverhead River to be navigable for recreational use under the pleasure-boat test and the commercial use test. While we affirm the result,
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able for recreation, the public not only could float on the stream but also
had portage rights to cross Hildreth’s land to navigate around barriers in the
water.150
Like early public trust cases, the Curran and Hildreth decisions rejected landowner monopolization of PTD water resources, preserving them for
public recreational use.151
2. Ecological Preservation
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the PTD has evolved to
preserve ecosystems and other uses of trust resources, including nonconsumptive purposes such as wildlife viewing, scientific study, and conservation for future generations.152 In the 1970s and 1980s, California courts
embraced an expanded interpretation of PTD purposes that included ecological preservation,153 and other state courts have reached the same conclu-

we find it unnecessary and improper to determine a specific test under which to find
navigability for recreational use. The pleasure-boat test is a test which has not been
adopted in Montana and the commercial use test is a federal test designed to determine navigability for title purposes and not navigability for use. Neither are suitable
nor appropriate here. . . . We have not limited the recreational use of the State’s waters by devising a specific test. As we held in Curran, the capability of use of the
waters for recreational purposes determines whether the waters can be so used.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
150
Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091, 1094. The portage rights recognized by the Montana Supreme
Court are limited to those with the least intrusive effects on private property. Id. The court subsequently clarified that the state could not require private landowners to assume the cost of maintaining portage routes. Galt v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 916
(Mont. 1987). The Montana Supreme Court stated:
[A]lthough the recreational user has a right to portage around obstructions minimally impacting the adjoining landowner’s fee interest, there can be no responsibility on
behalf of the landowner to pay for such portage route. The landowner receives no
benefit from the portage. The benefit flows to the public and the expense should be
borne by the State.
Id.
151

Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091; Curran, 682 P.2d at 171.
See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719 (acknowledging that the “principal values” the
plaintiffs sought to protect were “recreational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its
shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by birds,” and concluding that “protection of these values is among the purposes of the public trust”); City of Berkeley,
606 P.2d at 365 (noting “the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural state as ecological units
for scientific study”); Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (“Public trust easements . . . have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.”).
153
See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719; City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 365; Marks, 491 P.2d at
380.
152
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sion.154 In thus expanding PTD purposes, courts have recognized the interconnectedness of natural resources, as well as the fact that private monopolization of one resource, like water, can have cascading effects on other
public resources, such as wildlife and recreation.
In 1971, in Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court rejected a
private landowner’s attempt to develop—and therefore monopolize—
tidelands on the Pacific Ocean.155 Larry Marks had acquired title to tidelands abutting the shoreline of Peter Whitney’s upland property under an
1874 state patent.156 Marks had record title to the tidelands, and thus
claimed he could fill them for development.157 Whitney, his neighbor, objected, maintaining that Marks’ tideland development plans would unlawfully eviscerate his rights both as a littoral owner and as a member of the
public to access the tidelands and the navigable waters covering them.158
The trial court settled the common boundary line but enjoined Whitney
from using the tidelands as a member of the public.159 Whitney appealed.160

154
See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982) (upholding a public interest in “preservation” of state waters); Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 76 n.20 (Haw.
1982) (extending PTD protection to “a free-flowing stream for its own sake”); In re Dravo Basic
Materials Co., 604 So.2d 630, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“A public trust for the protection, conservation, and replenishment of the environment, including the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetics quality of the environment is mandated by the Louisiana Constitution.”); Bayview Land, Ltd.
v. State ex rel. Clark, 950 So.2d 966, 979 (Miss. 2006) (“This Court has held the many public
purposes of the trust to include ‘navigation and transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming, and other recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental protection and preservation, the enhancement of aquatic, avarian and marine life, sea agriculture and no
doubt others.’” (quoting Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So.2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986))); Mineral County v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (“Although the
original objectives of the public trust were to protect the public’s rights in navigation, commerce,
and fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass additional public values—including recreational
and ecological uses.”); Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 838 (“[W]e find the public trust doctrine manifested
in . . . South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act, authorizing legal action to protect ‘the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.’”); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah
1993) (“The ‘public trust’ doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their
public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.”); Orion Corp., 747 P.2d at 1083
(“The record persuasively establishes that Padilla Bay is subject to the public trust rights and that
the public has an intense interest in prohibiting tideland uses that would endanger the ecological
environment . . . .”); see also Craig, supra note 124, at 80–91.
155
Marks, 491 P.2d at 378, 381.
156
Id. at 377.
157
Id.
158
Id. The court explained that “[t]idelands are properly those lands lying between the lines of
mean high and low tide covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow thereof. The trial court found
that the portion of Marks’ lands here under consideration constitutes a part of the tidelands of
Tomales Bay. . . .” Id. at 378–79 (internal citations omitted).
159
Id. at 377–78, 381.
160
Id. at 378.
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The Supreme Court of California acknowledged Marks’ title to the
tidelands but made clear that California’s conveyance creating private ownership did not extinguish the public trust.161 Consequently, Marks’ private
ownership could not divest the public—including Whitney—of access
rights to tidelands held in trust.162
The Marks court explained that preventing landowner monopolization
of tidelands was a “matter of great public importance, particularly in view
of population pressures, demands for recreational property, and the increasing development of seashore and waterfront property.”163 In support of public access, the court clarified that California’s PTD-protected uses of trust
resources extended beyond the traditional triad of commerce, navigation,
and fishing.164 Accordingly, public trust uses are not static, but rather are
flexible and can accommodate evolving public needs.165 Presciently, the
court stated that the PTD extended to recreation and conservation:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within
the tidelands trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific
161

Id. at 379. The court explained, “California acquired title to the navigable waterways and
tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 1850. This title is different in
character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. The state holds tidelands in
trust for public purposes, traditionally delineated in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries.”
Id. at 379 n.5 (internal citations omitted). Further noting:
the public right was not intended to be divested or affected by a sale of tide lands
under these general laws relating alike both to swamp land and tidelands. Our opinion is that . . . the buyer of land under these statutes receives the title to the soil, the
jus privatum, subject to the public right of navigation, and in subordination to the
right of the state to take possession and use and improve it for that purpose, as it
may deem necessary.
Id. at 379.
162
Id. at 381 (“There is absolutely no merit in Marks’ contention that as the owner of the Jus
privatum under this patent he may fill and develop his property, whether for navigational purposes
or not . . . .”).
163
Id. at 378.
164
See id. at 380.
165
Id. (“The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Ill.
Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892) (“[The governing of the public trust] must vary
with varying circumstances. The legislation which may be needed one day for the [waterway in
question] may be different from the legislation that may be required at another day.”); In re Water
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (“The public trust, by its very nature, does not remain
fixed for all time, but must conform to changing needs and circumstances.”); Borough of Neptune
City, 294 A.2d at 54 (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit.”).
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study, as open space, and as environments which provide food
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect
the scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands.166
Marks thus began the trend toward public trust protection for resources
of ecological value.167
Another California public trust case, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), reinforced the idea that the PTD protects ecological
conservation and other public uses beyond commerce, navigation, and fishing.168 Environmentalists challenged a 1940 state grant of a water right to divert water from streams feeding Mono Lake to the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power (DWP) for municipal water, alleging violations of several
state statutes and the PTD.169 The state and the DWP defended on the ground
that municipal use of was the highest use of water under state water law.170
Although the state knew of the likely damage to Mono Lake when it granted
the water right in 1940, the water agency assumed that it had no authority to
prevent damage caused by the diversions.171 By 1979, the diversions had a
drastic effect on Mono Lake, shrinking the lake by 85 square miles to just 60
square miles, with further declines imminent.172 Shrimp populations in the
166

Marks, 491 P.2d at 380.
See id.
168
See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz,
Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (discussing the legacy of this case); Sherry A. Enzler, How Law Mattered to the Mono Lake Ecosystem, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 413 (2011) (explaining how this case helped
preserve the larger Mono Lake ecosystem); Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water
Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45
ENVTL. L. 561 (2015) (providing a detailed background on this case from someone who lived
nearby).
169
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
170
Id. at 714 n.6.
171
Id. The court cited the Water Board’s reasoning in the following terms:
167

The Board’s decision states that “[i]t is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed
development will result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but
there is apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it. The use to which the
City proposes to put the water under its Applications . . . is defined by the Water
Commission Act as the highest to which water may be applied and to make available unappropriated water for this use the City has, by the condemnation proceedings
described above, acquired the littoral and riparian rights on Mono Lake and its tributaries south of Mill Creek. This office therefore has no alternative but to dismiss all
protests based upon the possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake and the
effect that the diversion of water from these streams may have upon the aesthetic
and recreational value of the Basin.”
Id.
172
Id. The Water Board anticipated diminishment to 38 square miles or fewer—which would
have been less than half the size of the pre-diversion lake. Id. at 715.
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lake, upon which millions of local and migratory birds relied, declined significantly.173 Human uses of Mono Lake like boating, fishing, and wildlife viewing were also adversely affected.174
When they did not obtain relief in the lower courts, the environmentalists appealed.175 In 1983, the California Supreme Court ruled that a state
agency’s failure to consider the detrimental environmental effects on a
lake’s ecosystem of the diversions violated the PTD.176 The court recognized that the “principal values” the environmentalists sought to protect
were “recreational and ecological—the scenic views of the lake and its
shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for nesting and feeding by
birds.”177 Concluding that “protection of these values is among the purposes
173

Id. The California Supreme Court explained:

Plaintiffs predict that the lake’s steadily increasing salinity, if unchecked, will wreak
havoc throughout the local food chain. They contend that the lake’s algae, and the
brine shrimp and brine flies that feed on it, cannot survive the projected salinity increase . . . . DWP’s diversions also present several threats to the millions of local
and migratory birds using the lake. First, since many species of birds feed on the
lake’s brine shrimp, any reduction in shrimp population allegedly caused by rising
salinity endangers a major avian food source. The Task Force Report considered it
‘unlikely that any of Mono Lake’s major bird species . . . will persist at the lake if
populations of invertebrates disappear.’ Second, the increasing salinity makes it
more difficult for the birds to maintain osmotic equilibrium with their environment.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
174
See id. at 716. The court stated:
[T]he lake’s recession obviously diminishes its value as an economic, recreational,
and scenic resource. Of course, there will be less lake to use and enjoy. The declining shrimp hatch depresses a local shrimping industry. The rings of dry lake bed are
difficult to traverse on foot, and thus impair human access to the lake, and reduce
the lake’s substantial scenic value. Mono Lake has long been treasured as a unique
scenic, recreational and scientific resource, but continued diversions threaten to turn
it into a desert wasteland like the dry bed of Owens Lake.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
175
Id. at 717.
176
Id. at 712 (explaining “we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water
diversions they should consider the effect of such diversions upon interests protected by the public
trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to those interests”). The court
began its opinion by describing the ecological importance of Mono Lake:
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California, sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park. The lake is saline; it contains no fish but supports a large population of brine shrimp which feed
vast numbers of nesting and migratory birds. Islands in the lake protect a large
breeding colony of California gulls, and the lake itself serves as a haven on the migration route for thousands of Northern Phalarope, Wilson’s Phalarope, and Eared
Grebe. Towers and spires of tufa on the north and south shores are matters of geological interest and a tourist attraction.
Id. at 711.
177
Id. at 719.
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of the public trust,”178 the court agreed that the PTD required the state to
evaluate the ecological effects of water diversion adversely affecting trust
uses.179 As the court explained, the state had an ongoing duty to supervise
navigable waters and the lands beneath them, and thus could not grant water
rights that unnecessarily harm trust resources.180 Further, the court ruled that
PTD prevents anyone from obtaining a vested water right to a diversion
harming public trust uses.181 The decision effectively renounced monopolization of water that impaired public use and enjoyment of a PTD resource.182
Other state courts have also acknowledged ecological conservation as
a public trust purpose. For example, in 1982, the Hawaii Supreme Court
recognized public trust protection for the preservation of its state waters,183
answering questions about the state’s PTD that were certified to it by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which was considering
the state’s decision about water rights allocation in the Hanapepe River system.184 The court instructed that state law required private landowners to
leave additional water in the river, because their diversions caused the river
to nearly run dry during part of the year, violating the PTD.185 Describing
178

Id.
Id. at 732. In doing so, however, the court clarified that it did not “dictate any particular
allocation of water.” Id. Rather, the court stated:
179

As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to the public trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must
bear in mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the public
trust, and to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected
by the trust.
Id. at 728 (internal citation omitted).
180
Id. at 727. The Mono Lake court explained:
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters. This principle, fundamental to the concept
of the public trust, applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands
and lakeshores; it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.
Id.
181

Id. at 712.
See id. at 712, 727. It remains somewhat of a puzzle as to why the Mono Lake decision has
not played a more prominent role in California water law, having little apparent effect on ensuing
case law. See id. at 712; Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Administrative State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1114, 1139 (2012) (finding that the primary
effect of the case has been on the State Water Resources Control Board decisions). If the water
board has institutionalized PTD consideration into its decision-making, though, the Mono Lake
case has in fact significantly altered California water law. Owen, supra at 1139; see Mono Lake,
658 P.2d at 712.
183
Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310–11.
184
Id. at 292; see McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1343 (Haw. 1973).
185
Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310; see McBryde Sugar Co., 504 P.2d at 1334, 1346.
182
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the state’s public trust, the court explained that the PTD extended to the
preservation of water resources, imposing on the state “a concomitant duty
to maintain the purity and flow of our waters for future generations.”186
Like the California courts, the Hawaii Supreme Court thus extended
PTD antimonopoly protection to public uses beyond commerce, navigation,
and fishing to ecological conservation.187 Other state courts have agreed.188
B. Expanding Public Trust Resources
In recent decades, states have expanded the PTD’s antimonopoly impulse to include an increasing number of natural resources,189 extending
public rights beyond waterways and protecting both public access and the
resources themselves. Thus far, beyond navigable and tidal waters, courts
have embraced all of the following under the public trust: (1) wildlife,190 (2)
186

Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310.
See generally Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to
Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749,
761 (1992) (“The marriage of absolute ecological protection with absolute access for the purpose
of utilizing natural resources comes the closest to the true essence of the public trust doctrine.”).
188
See, e.g., Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311 (upholding a public interest in “preservation” of state
waters); Reppun, 656 P.2d at 76 n.20 (extending PTD protection to “a free-flowing stream for its
own sake”); In re Dravo Basic Materials Co., 604 So.2d 630, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“A public
trust for the protection, conservation, and replenishment of the environment, including the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetics quality of the environment is mandated by the Louisiana Constitution.”); Bayview Land, Ltd., 950 So.2d at 979 (“This Court has held the many public purposes of
the trust to include navigation and transportation, commerce, fishing, bathing, swimming, and
other recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental protection and
preservation, the enhancement of aquatic, avarian and marine life, sea agriculture and no doubt
others.”); Mineral Cnty., 20 P.3d at 807 (“Although the original objectives of the public trust were
to protect the public’s rights in navigation, commerce, and fishing, the trust has evolved to encompass additional public values—including recreational and ecological uses.”); Parks, 676
N.W.2d at 838 (“[W]e find the public trust doctrine manifested in . . . South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act, authorizing legal action to protect ‘the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.’” (quoting S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1 (2004)); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 869 P.2d at 919 (“The
‘public trust’ doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.”); Orion Corp., 747 P.2d at 1083 (“The record
persuasively establishes that Padilla Bay is subject to the public trust rights and that the public has
an intense interest in prohibiting tideland uses that would endanger the ecological environment
. . . .”); see also Craig, supra note 124, at 80–91 (discussing the emergence of ecologically related
PTDs in western states).
189
See Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 107,
116–21 (1986) (describing states’ extension of public trust protection to an increasing number of
natural resources).
190
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896). The United States Supreme Court, in
1896, embraced wildlife as part of the PTD in Geer v. Connecticut, and nearly all states have followed suit. Id.; see Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1466 (asserting that at least forty-eight
states have used public trust or trust-like language to describe their wildlife resources); see, e.g.,
Pullen, 923 P.2d at 61 (concluding that the PTD applies to salmon and other fish). In Horne v.
187
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wildlife habitat connected to navigable waters,191 (3) marine life,192 (4)
drinking water,193 (5) groundwater,194 (6) artificial waters,195 (7) inland wetlands,196 (8) state parks,197 (9) the dry sand area of beaches,198 and (10) archaeological remains.199 Discussing a few of those public trust extensions—
to non-navigable-in-fact waters, upland resources, and potentially the atmosphere—illustrates the doctrine’s evolution to protect additional natural
resources from private monopolization.
1. Non-Navigable-in-Fact Waters
Some states have extended PTD antimonopoly protection to nonnavigable-in-fact waters, including drinking water,200 groundwater,201 sea-

U.S. Department of Agriculture, the United States Supreme Court ratified the sovereign ownership
of wildlife doctrine. 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015); see John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm,
Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign
Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REV. 657, 688–97 (2016).
191
See Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (deciding that the public trust encompasses purposes broader
than the traditional uses of navigation, commerce, and fishing, including use as open space, for
wildlife study, for scientific study, and for swimming).
192
See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 673
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (applying the public trust doctrine to living marine resources).
193
See, e.g., Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) (stating that the public trust doctrine includes drinking water resources).
194
See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (ruling that groundwater is a
public trust resource).
195
See, e.g., Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–25 (relying on public ownership of all state water to
establish public access to three lakes created on private land by several unseasonably wet years).
196
See, e.g., Just, 201 N.W.2d at 769 (applying the public trust doctrine to inland wetlands).
197
See, e.g., Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126 (determining that privatization of a substantial part of
a public park violated the state’s PTD); Friends of Van Cortland Park v. City of N.Y., 750 N.E.2d
1050, 1054–55 (N.Y. 2001) (finding a park to be within the state’s PTD); see also Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (extending public trust protection to a
national park).
198
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984) (explaining that the public trust doctrine requires public access to the dry sand area of beaches between the high water mark and the vegetation line); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d
187, 197 (N.C. App. 2015) (discussed infra notes 227–231 and accompanying text). See generally
Mackenzie S. Keith, Judicial Protection for Beaches and Parks: The Public Trust Doctrine Above
the High Water Mark, 16 HASTINGS W.-NW.J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165 (2010) (discussing how
the PTD can, and should, be used to protect upland areas, such as dry sand beaches and parks).
199
See, e.g., Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Ill. 1984) (finding archaeological
remains to be within the state’s public trust). But see San Diego Cnty. Archaeological Soc’y, Inc.
v. Compadres, 81 Cal.App.3d 923, 927 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the PTD does not apply to
archaeological remains).
200
See Clifton, 539 A.2d at 765 (stating that the public trust doctrine includes drinking water
resources).
201
See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447 (extending the public trust doctrine
to groundwater).
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sonal waters,202 and inland wetlands.203 For example, extending the PTD to
drinking water supplies, a New Jersey court invalidated a water commission’s distribution of funds to municipalities, holding that drinking water,
along with any financial benefits it accrued, was a public trust resource.204
According to the court:
While the original purpose of the public trust doctrine was to preserve the use of the public natural water for navigation, commerce and fishing, it is clear that since water is essential for human life, the doctrine applies with equal impact upon the control
of our drinking water reserves . . . . Ultimate ownership rests in
the people and this precious natural resource is held by the state
in trust for the public benefit.205
Consequently, the water commission could not charge rates in excess of its
cost of water production and transfer the money it made to the municipalities that owned the water.206 The court thus prevented financial monopolization of the economic benefits through sale of a renewable public trust resource.207
202
See Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–25 (relying on public ownership of all state water to suggest that the public had access to three lakes created on private land by several unseasonably wet
years).
203
See Just, 201 N.W.2d at 769 (finding that inland wetlands were part of the state’s public
trust).
204
Clifton, 539 A.2d at 765, 767.
205
Id. at 765 (internal citations omitted). The court explained:

Water is an essential commodity which all of nature requires for survival. Our food
supply is derived through water which combines with nutrients and minerals to form
the fruits and vegetables which become part of our daily diet. The plants of the soil,
nurtured by water and consumed by animals, provide our main staple of meat. Like
the plants and animals, we too must be nurtured by water . . . . Potable water, then, is
an essential commodity which every individual requires in order to sustain human
existence.
Id at 765.
206
Id. at 767.
207
See id. In another case involving non-coastal waters, in 2004, the South Dakota Supreme
Court decided that water in seasonal lakes was a public trust resource. Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 824–
25. After a series of unseasonably wet years caused water to accumulate in three large lakes, in
Parks v. Cooper, the court ruled that the public could use those lakes for recreation, concluding
that the water was a public trust resource and therefore not susceptible to private ownership, rejecting landowners’ arguments that the land hosting the seasonal lakes was private property. Id.
Specifically, the court determined that the public lacked access rights on water over private lands:
We conclude that all the water in South Dakota belongs to the people in accord with
the public trust doctrine and as declared by statute and precedent, and thus, although
the lake beds are mostly privately owned, the water in the lakes is public and may be
converted to public use, developed for public benefit, and appropriated, in accord
with legislative direction and state regulation.
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In 2000, in another case challenging agency allocation of water rights,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided that groundwater was a public trust
resource.208 In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch
concerned Native Hawaiian residents challenged water exports in Waiahole
Ditch from the windward side of Oahu to the leeward side of the island for
agricultural irrigation.209 The natives argued that the ditch reduced the flow
in several windward streams, harming wildlife and members of the public.210 Reviewing the state’s expansive constitutional public trust—which
extends to “all public resources”—the court concluded that “the public trust
doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction,”
including groundwater.211 The state’s public trust in groundwater required
the state water agency to revise its decision to allocate water rights to private parties and preserve water for public use, thereby invoking the PTD to
prevent monopolization of groundwater. 212
In 2014, a California trial court also decided that groundwater pumping adversely affected a navigable river and, in doing so, violated the
PTD.213 Environmentalists claimed that groundwater hydrologically connected to the navigable Scott River was a public trust resource.214 They
Id. at 825. This result expanded the state’s public trust well beyond traditional navigable-in-fact
waterways, preventing monopolization of seasonal lakes that were suitable for public recreation.
Id. at 838–39 (“Today we acknowledge, in accord with the State’s sovereign powers and the legislative mandate, that all the waters in South Dakota, not just those waters considered to be navigable under the federal test, are held in test for the public.”).
208
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 447.
209
Id. at 422.
210
Id. at 422–23. The court reasoned:
Diversions by the ditch system reduced the flows in several windward streams, specifically, Waiāhole, Waianu, Waikāne, and Kahana streams, affecting the natural
environment and human communities dependent upon them. Diminished flows impaired native stream life and may have contributed to the decline in the greater
Kāne’ohe Bay ecosystem, including the offshore fisheries. The impacts of stream
diversion, however, went largely unacknowledged until, in the early 1990s, the sugar industry on O’ahu came to a close.
Id.
211

Id. at 445 (“The Hawai’i Constitution declares that ‘all public resources are held in trust by
the state for the benefit of its people,’ . . . and establishes a public trust obligation ‘to protect, control, and regulate the use of Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people,’”). The court
explained that “the common law distinctions between ground and surface water developed without
regard to the manner in which ‘both categories represent no more than a single integrated source
of water with each element dependent upon the other for its existence.’ . . . Modern science and
technology have discredited the surface-ground dichotomy.” Id. at 447 (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 73 (Haw. 1982)).
212
See id. at 453, 501–02.
213
Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, at *7, *10
(Sup. Ct. Cal. July 15, 2014), available at http:////www.envirolaw.org/documents/ScottOrderon
CrossMotions.pdf [https:////perma.cc/RNY2-FL6W].
214
Id. at *8.
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asked the court to enjoin a county from issuing well-drilling permits until it
complied with the constraints imposed by the PTD.215 The Scott River, used
for boating and fishing, among other purposes, is often dewatered in the
summer and early fall, allegedly due to groundwater pumping. The environmentalists claimed that the low water levels hindered recreational activities on Scott River and also harmed fish.216 The county regulating groundwater pumping had not considered public trust implications before issuing
the permits,217 and the court concluded that groundwater pumping would be
subject to the PTD, if in fact it harmed the navigable Scott River.218 The
result made clear that the state could not privatize groundwater to the detriment of public use of the river.
2. Beaches
Courts have increasingly moved the PTD’s antimonopoly protection
inland, including beaches.219 In 2005, for example, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey upheld the public’s right to access a privately owned beach un215

Id. at *2. The environmentalists sued both the State Water Resources Control Board and
the county. Id. They did not seek affirmative relief from the Board, but instead a judicial declaration that the PTD applies to groundwater hydrologically connected to a navigable river. Id.
216
Id. at *3–4 (“According to the Petitioners, at times almost every gallon of groundwater
pumped decreases the flow of the Scott River by the same amount.”).
217
Id. at *4. The court in Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District,
however, declined to declare that groundwater was a public trust resource because the California
Court of Appeals earlier limited the California PTD’s scope to navigable surface waters. 209 Cal.
App. 3d 1276, 1286 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Envtl. Law Found., No. 34-2010-80000583 at *8
(“Petitioners request a declaration groundwater hydrologically connected to navigable surface
flows is protected by the public trust doctrine. However, the court does not find groundwater itself
is a resource protected by the public trust doctrine.”).
218
Envtl. Law Found., No. 34-2010-80000583 at *9–10 (citing Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721).
As the court explained, California’s public trust applies to effects of groundwater pumping that
damaged a navigable water by impairing recreation or ecological function. Id. at *9. The court
decided:
[The PTD] protects the Scott River and the public’s right to use the Scott River for
trust purposes, including fishing, rafting and boating. It also protects the public’s
right to use, enjoy and preserve the Scott River in its natural state and as a habitat
for fish. If the extraction of groundwater near the Scott River adversely affects those
rights, the public trust doctrine applies.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
219
See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54 (relying on the public trust to reject
restrictions on public uses of beaches); see also State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673
(Or. 1969) (holding that the state of Oregon could prevent landowners from enclosing a dry sand
area contained within the legal description of their ocean-front property); id. at 678–79 (Denecke,
J., concurring) (reaching the same conclusion, but on PTD grounds). For an additional discussion
of this case and the pertinent concurring PTD opinion see Michael C. Blumm & Erika Doot, Oregon’s Public Trust Doctrine: Public Rights in Waters, Wildlife, and Beaches, 42 ENVTL. L. 375,
408–10.
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der the PTD.220 In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.,
a beach access group sued a private beach club that had excluded the public
from using a dry-sand beach, asserting that this exclusion violated the public trust.221 The trial court found for the beach access group, deciding that
the public was entitled to a right of access and a court of appeals affirmed
that ruling.222
The Supreme Court of New Jersey also affirmed, ruling that the club
must allow public use of the beach, subject to a fee for the club’s maintenance of the beach, as approved by the state’s Department of Environmental
Protection, under the PTD.223 Quoting an earlier New Jersey PTD beach
case, the court explained:
Exercise of the public’s right to swim and bathe below the mean
high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach. Without some means of access the public right to use
the foreshore would be meaningless. To say that the public trust
doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean and to use the
foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the public of a
feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the public trust doctrine.224
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n thus relied on the PTD to prevent private monopolization of an upland dry-sand beach that would have limited public
access to and enjoyment of the ocean.
In 2015, the North Carolina Court of Appeals gave public trust protection to a publicly built, renourished dry-sand beach.225 A North Carolina statute claimed state ownership of dry-sand beaches replenished through dredging or other means, if the creation was publicly funded.226 The Town of Em220

Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J. 2005).
Id. at 113, 116.
222
Id. at 117–18.
223
Id. at 113.
224
Id. at 120 (quoting Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364).
225
Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 202. The court explained, “The ‘dry sand beach’ is the portion of the
beach landward of the mean high water mark and continuing to the high water mark of the storm
tide.” Id. at 190.
226
Id. at 191. North Carolina law specifically states:
221

Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the title to land in or immediately along the Atlantic Ocean raised above the mean high water mark by publicly
financed projects which involve hydraulic dredging or other deposition of spoil materials or sand vests in the State. Title to such lands raised through projects that received no public funding vests in the adjacent littoral proprietor. All such raised
lands shall remain open to the free use and enjoyment of the people of the State,
consistent with the public trust rights in ocean beaches, which rights are part of the
common heritage of the people of this State.
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erald Isle funded the development of a dry-sand beach in front of private
property and prohibited driving on the renourished beach, asserting that the
new beach was subject to the PTD.227 The property owners sued, arguing that
the beach was not a public trust resource. But the trial court found in favor of
the town.228 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that
ocean beaches shoreward of the vegetation line are subject to the state’s
PTD.229 Like other cases expanding the public trust inland, the decision prevented landowner monopolization of an upland resource.
3. Parks
In some states, the PTD has fully emerged from the water, extending to
parklands.230 For example, a half-century ago in the 1966 decision of Gould
v. Greylock, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court treated a state park,
the Greylock State Reservation, as a public trust resource.231 Five citizens,
including Mildred Gould, sued the Greylock Reservation Commission (“the
Commission”) because the Commission planned to allow construction of a
large ski resort extending into the reservation, arguing that the proposed
expansion violated the PTD.232 The court agreed with Gould, concluding
that the statutes governing the Commission did not authorize the conveyN.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-6(f) (2016).
227
Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 191–92.
228
Id. at 193.
229
Id. at 196–97. The North Carolina Court of Appeals explained:
We adopt the test suggested in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(e): “Natural indicators of the
landward extent of the ocean beaches include, but are not limited to, the first line of
stable, natural vegetation; the toe of the frontal dune; and the storm trash line.” . . . For
the purposes of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20, the landward boundary of North Carolina
ocean beaches is the discernable reach of the “storm” tide. This boundary represents
the extent of semi-regular submersion of land by ocean waters sufficient to prevent the
seaward expansion of frontal dunes, or stable, natural vegetation, where such dunes or
vegetation exist. Where both frontal dunes and natural vegetation exist, the high water
mark shall be the seaward of the two lines. Where no frontal dunes nor stable, natural
vegetation exists, the high water mark shall be determined by some other reasonable
method, which may involve determination of the “storm trash line” or any other reliable indicator of the mean regular extent of the storm tide. The ocean beaches of North
Carolina, as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-20(e) and this opinion, are subject to
public trust rights unless those rights have been expressly abandoned by the State.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
230
See Reed, supra note 189, at 107, 116–17 (discussing upland PTD cases). See generally
Keith, supra note 198 (discussing upland PTD cases).
231
See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
232
See id. at 116. The proposed resort on Mount Greylock was to become highly developed,
“with a large activity center at the base of the mountain including an access road, a swimming
pool, restaurant, fireplace, barbecue pit, bar, sun deck, summer dance terrace, ski shop, gift shop,
ski rental and repair room, and parking space for [two thousand] automobiles.” Id. at 120.
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ance.233 Using the PTD to interpret the statute,234 the court explained that
the Greylock reservation “is not to be diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit legislation to that end. . . .The policy of
the Commonwealth has been to add to the common law inviolability of
parks’ express prohibition against encroachment.”235 The court decided that
because the statutes did not expressly allow the Commission to permit development of a ski resort, issuing the lease violated the state’s PTD.236
Gould was the first decision to apply the PTD to an inland park, thus preventing private monopolization of public park resources and preserving
them for public use.237
In ensuing years, other courts have extended PTD antimonopoly protection to parks.238 In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals prohibited state
agencies from using parklands for parking vehicles, affirming a lower court
decision that deemed this storage use inconsistent with park purposes, and
thus violative of the public trust.239 As the court explained, “[d]edicated
park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust and their use for
other than park purposes, either for a period of years or permanently, requires the direct and specific approval of the State Legislature, plainly conferred,” which had not occurred.240
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. For example, the California Court of Appeals relied on the PTD to enjoin a city from allowing a
developer to use property dedicated for a public library for commercial pur-

233

Id. at 120.
See generally William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: ProcessBased Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 439–41 (1997) (discussing courts’ interpretations of
statutory PTDs).
235
Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 121 (internal quotation omitted).
236
Id. at 126; see Sax, supra note 2, at 491–95 (1970) (discussing Gould in detail).
237
See Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
238
See, e.g., Cty. of Solano v. Handlery, 155 Cal. App. 4th 566, 576 (Ct. App. 2007) (relying
on the PTD grounds to prevent a county from disposing of land used for a county fair); Big Sur
Properties v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 3d 99, 107 (Ct. App. 1976) (relying on the PTD to prevent conveyance of a private right-of-way across park land); Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of N.Y., No.
0031145-06, WL 6916531, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 20, 2013) (relying, in an unreported case, on
the PTD to prevent New York City from allowing construction of a solid waste management facility on park lands).
239
Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1984), aff’d 489 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y.
1985) (mem.). The agencies stored approximately 100 vehicles, including snow removal equipment, as well as other materials and physical improvements, on part of Cunningham Park. Id.
Citizens sued to have the agencies remove the vehicles, materials, and improvements, and the trial
court dismissed their suit. Id. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the agencies had violated the PTD by using the park for a non-park purpose and ordered removal of the equipment. Id.
at 557–58.
240
Id. at 558.
234
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poses.241 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a trial court
decision that set aside a city’s conveyance of parklands to the University of
Pennsylvania, concluding that the city held the parklands as part of the public trust, and thus could not convey them.242 And the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that citizens may challenge conveyances of parklands.243 These decisions interpreting the PTD to include parklands all reflect the doctrine’s antimonopoly tenets, preventing privatization of public inland resources.
4. Wildlife
The United States Supreme Court recognized wildlife as a trust resource in Geer v. Connecticut in 1896.244 In the years since Geer, the vast
majority of states have used public trust language to refer to their sovereign
ownership of wild animals, and many states have expressly recognized a
public trust in wildlife.245
For example, in Owsichek v. Guide Licensing & Control Board, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held in 1988 that wild animals are part of that
state’s PTD.246 The state Guide Licensing and Control Board (“the Board”)
created exclusive guide areas that hunting guide Kenneth Owsichek challenged as unconstitutional, although not on the basis of Alaska’s PTD.247
The trial court upheld the Board’s action, and Owsichek appealed.248 The
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the trust “impose[d] upon the state a
trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for
the benefit of all the people,”249 preventing the Board from creating exclu241
Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 215 Cal. App. 3d
1003, 1017 (Ct. App. 1989).
242
Bd. of Tr. of Phila. Museum v. Tr. of Univ. of Pa., 96 A. 123, 126 (Pa. 1915).
243
Paepcke v. Pub. Building Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970). In another recent
Illinois PTD park case, a federal court allowed a case to go forward that challenged construction
of a museum on parklands on PTD grounds. Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 14-cv09096, 2015 WL 1188615, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2015). The Chicago Park District agreed to
allow construction of a George Lucas “Star Wars” museum on a parking lot in Burnham Park, but
a public interest group challenged that agreement as a violation of the PTD, arguing that conveyance of the parking lot was impermissible. Id. at *1. The Chicago Park District moved to dismiss,
but the court denied that motion as it applied to the PTD. Id. at *1, *7. In the wake of the court’s
decision, Lucas dropped plans to site the museum in Chicago. Alex Stedman, George Lucas
Drops Plans for Museum in Chicago, VARIETY, http:////variety.com/2016/film/news/george-lucasmuseum-chicago-drops-plans-1201803673/ [https:////perma.cc/T63V-V9SW].
244
Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.
245
See id.; Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 3, at 1471–73 (identifying twenty-two states that
have expressly adopted a wildlife PTD, as well as twenty-two other states that use trust-like language to describe their sovereign ownership of wildlife).
246
Owsichek v. Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988).
247
Id. at 488–91.
248
Id. at 491.
249
Id. at 495.
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sive guide areas allowing select guides to exclude competitors.250 Since
Owsichek, the Alaska Supreme Court has acknowledged the state’s wildlife
trust in a number of other opinions.251
In 2008, the California Court of Appeals upheld the state’s public trust
in wildlife and also concluded that members of the public had standing to
challenge state wildlife management under the PTD in Center for Biological Diversity v. FPL Group, Inc.252 Environmentalists sued a number of private wind energy owners and operators in California, alleging that more
than five thousand wind turbines in Altamont Pass had killed tens of thousands of birds since the 1980s, and that the operators had violated the PTD
and numerous state statutes.253 The environmentalists claimed that the bird
deaths were due in large part to the operators’ outdated turbines, and they
challenged the government’s decision to renew the operators’ permits.254
A trial court dismissed the case ruling that the environmentalists lacked
standing to sue a private party for violation of the public trust,255 and the
California Court of Appeal affirmed.256 However, the appellate court stated
that the public could sue the state to enforce the sovereign’s obligation to
conserve wildlife as a public trust resource,257 and thus resist monopolization of wildlife resources.

250

Id. at 496.
See, e.g., Pebble Ltd. P’ship. ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1074
(Alaska 2009) (explaining that “common law principles incorporated in the common use clause
impose upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for
the benefit of all the people” (quoting Pullen, 923 P.2d at 60)) (citation omitted); Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 424 (Alaska 2006) (Observing
that the Alaska Constitution imposes a “public trust responsibility . . . to take care of fish, wildlife,
and water resources of the state . . . . [C]onclud[ing] that ‘naturally occurring salmon are, like
other state natural resources, state assets belonging to the state . . . for the benefit of all its people.’” (quoting Pullen, 923 P.2d at 61 (1996)); Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1030–31 (Alaska
1999) (noting that the Alaska Constitution made the state the trustee of wildlife); Pullen, 923 P.2d
at 60–61 (noting that the PTD “compel[s] the conclusion that fish occurring in their natural state
are property of the state for purposes of carrying out its trust responsibilities . . . the state’s interest
in salmon migrating in state and inland waters warrant[s] characterizing such salmon as assets of
the state which may not be appropriated”) (internal citation omitted).
252
83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 600–01 (Ct. App. 2008).
253
Id. at 592.
254
Id.
255
Id. According to the trial court, “No statutory or common law authority supports a cause of
action by a private party for violation of the public trust doctrine arising from the destruction of
wild animals.” Id.
256
Id. at 604–05.
257
Id. at 600–01 (“The interests encompassed by the public trust undoubtedly are protected
by public agencies acting pursuant to their police power and explicit statutory authorization.
Nonetheless, the public retains the right to bring actions to enforce the trust when the public agencies fail to discharge their duties.”).
251
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5. The Atmosphere
Groups of individual children recently filed suits, asking state and federal courts to recognize an “atmospheric trust”—that is, a trust to protect the
atmosphere from the harms of human-induced climate change.258 In seeking
to require agencies to respond to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions causing
climate change, the children claim that the PTD limits private activities that
cause emissions to harm the atmosphere and thus the public. Courts in Alaska, New Mexico, Minnesota, Iowa, and Montana have dismissed such cases
for lack of justiciability.259 The Alaska court suggested, however, that the result might be different if the children could show that GHG emissions were
causing damage to trust resources like coastal tidelands and wetlands.260
In 2015, a Washington trial court concluded that since that state
acknowledged that GHG emissions had deleterious effects on the state’s
water resources, including navigable waters, the PTD could impose limits
on GHG emissions.261 In April 2016, the Washington trial court ordered the
state Department of Ecology to promulgate an emissions reduction rule by
the end of the year and by 2017 make recommendations to the state legislature on science-based GHG reductions.262 Similarly, in 2016, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found in favor of atmospheric trust plaintiffs,
stating that the state’s Department of Environmental Protection had failed to
carry out its statutory trust duties and ordered the agency to reduce annual
GHG emissions.263

258
See Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https:////www.ourchildrenstrust.org/us/federallawsuit/ [https:////perma.cc/6QNS-KSL7] (providing updated information on such litigation). See
generally Mary Christina Wood & Daniel M. Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making
the Fossil Fuel Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259 (2015) (arguing that the PTD protects a viable climate system and outlining so-called atmospheric trust litigation).
259
See e.g., Kanuk v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1103 (Alaska 2014); Filippone
v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A120585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012); Barhaugh v. Mont., No. OP 110258
(Mont.
Sup.
Ct.
June
15,
2011)
(mem.),
available
at
http:////supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/case?case=14512
[https:////perma.cc/TS4M-N977];
Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
260
Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1103.
261
Foster ex rel. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL
7721362 at *3–4 (Wash. Super. Nov. 19, 2015).
262
Foster ex rel. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No 14-2-25295-1 SEA, at *20 (Wash.
Super, Apr. 29, 2016), available at http:////westernlaw.org/sites/default/files/2016.04.29WA%20ATL%20Final%20Decision%20Bench%20Ruling%20Transcript.pdf
[https:////perma.cc/JYW7-8HEX].
263
Kain v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 49 N.E.3d 1124, 1142 (Mass. 2016).
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Also in 2016, a federal district court in Oregon declined to dismiss an
atmospheric trust case against the federal government.264 The childrenplaintiffs claimed that the federal government knows that carbon dioxide
pollution causes catastrophic climate change, including ocean acidification,
but failed to curtail fossil fuel emissions and allowed increased carbon pollution.265 They maintained that a series of government actions and inactions
had violated the PTD as well as federal constitutional provisions, including
the Due Process Clause.266 The government and several interveners involved in the manufacturing and petrochemical development industries
sought to dismiss the case, asserting that the PTD provides no cognizable
federal cause of action.267 The federal government also maintained that the
PTD was a state law doctrine, inapplicable to the federal government,268 an
argument that earlier succeeded in the D.C. Circuit.269 However, an Oregon

264

Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, at *23–24 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016), available at http:////ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/16.04.08.OrderDenyingMTD.pdf [https:////
perma.cc/N45R-5SLS]. For an update on the case, see infra notes 331–344 and accompanying
text, in the Postscript to this Article.
265
Id. at *2.
266
Id. The court explained:
Plaintiffs assert the actions and omissions of defendants that increased CO2 emissions
“shock the conscience,” and are infringing the plaintiffs’ right to life and liberty in violation of their substantive due process rights. Plaintiffs also allege defendants have violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights embedded in the Fifth Amendment by denying
them protections afforded to previous generations and by favoring short term economic
interests of certain citizens. Plaintiffs further allege defendants’ acts and omissions violate the implicit right, via the Ninth Amendment, to a stable climate and an ocean and
atmosphere free from dangerous levels of [carbon dioxide]. Finally, plaintiffs allege
defendants have violated a public trust doctrine, secured by the Ninth Amendment, by
denying future generations’ essential natural resources.
Id.
267

Id. at *4. The defendants also asserted that the youths lacked standing to bring suit, raised
non-justiciable political questions, and failed to state a constitutional claim. Id.
268
Id. at *17–18; See id. at *20 (Explaining that the plaintiff’s claim “does not at all implicate
the equal footing doctrine or public trust obligations of the State of Oregon. The public trust doctrine invoked instead is directed against the United States and its unique sovereign interests over
the territorial ocean waters and atmosphere of the nation.”).
269
Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) aff’d sub. nom. Alec L. ex rel.
Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F.App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.). In 2012, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an atmospheric trust claim against the federal government, ruling that the question was a matter of state law. Id. The plaintiff-children alleged that
federal agencies violated the public trust “by contributing to and allowing unsafe amounts of
greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere” and asked the court to declare that the agencies’
violation of the PTD ignored their duty to reduce global atmospheric carbon dioxide levels maintaining that the case arose from federal public trust law. Id. at 14–15. The court disagreed, concluding that the PTD is a matter of state—not federal—law. Id. at 15. Consequently, the court
dismissed the case, also opining that the issue of an atmospheric trust was essentially an unreviewable political question. See id. at 17. The D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed in an unreflective
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magistrate judge disagreed with that proposition, concluding that the federal
government at least has public trust obligations concerning effects on trust
resources that it controls, such as territorial seas.270 Thus the court declined
to dismiss the youths’ PTD claim.271 The litigation is ongoing at the time of
writing.272
As this discussion illustrates—and consistent with Holmes’ famous
dictum about the law reflecting the “felt necessities of the times”273 —the
scope of the American PTD has extended to an increasing number of natural
resources, including traditionally non-navigable waters, uplands like beaches and parklands, groundwater, and even the atmosphere where it affects
more traditional trust resources like navigable waters. In each instance,
courts have protected public use of natural resources, guarding against government approval of privatization that could divest or injure public rights.
C. Preventing Privatization of Public Trust Resources
State courts have reinforced the PTD’s sovereign restraint against alienating public resources, subject to the exceptions concerning conveyances
that either serve public trust purposes or do not substantially impair public
use of remaining trust resources.274 This non-alienation principle is an antimonopoly concept with deep historical roots, and it continues to serve as a
hallmark of the PTD.
1. Restraining Alienation of the Beds of Navigable Waters
In 1976, in People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District, the Illinois
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that conveyed nearly 200 acres of
lakebed to a private company, concluding that it had violated the PTD.275
The statute at issue conveyed roughly 195 acres of lands submerged beneath
opinion. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (mem.). For criticism of these opinions, see Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 3, at 400–02, 409.
270
Juliana, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, at *21–23. The court explained:
At this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot say that the public trust doctrine
does not provide at least some substantive due process protections for some plaintiffs within the navigable water areas of Oregon. Accordingly, the court should not
dismiss any claims under the public trust doctrine to that extent.
Id. at *23.
271
Id. at *23–24. While this article was in press, the district court affirmed the magistrate
judge’s decision. See infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text.
272
See infra notes 331–344 and accompanying text (discussing the ensuing decision by the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon).
273
HOLMES, supra note 24, at 1.
274
See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452; see supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
275
360 N.E.2d at 780–81.
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Lake Michigan, enabling U.S. Steel to expand a plant, for just under
$20,000.276 The Illinois Attorney General filed suit against the company and
the Chicago Park District, asking the trial court to invalidate the statute, and
it did so, preventing the conveyance.277 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court also agreed with the Illinois Attorney General, stating that the state
“holds title to submerged land . . . in trust for the people,” and that “governmental powers over these lands will not be relinquished.”278 The court
suggested that conveyances of significant natural resources warranted strict
scrutiny, noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had never upheld a grant
whose primary purpose was to benefit a private interest.279 Echoing the sentiment that the PTD is responsive to changing conditions and values,280 the
court concluded that the conveyance of the submerged lands adjacent to
public beaches would “irretrievably remove [those areas] from the use of
the people of Illinois,” thereby impairing public use of Lake Michigan.281
Similarly, in 1990, in Lake Michigan Federation v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, a federal district court declared that the state of Illinois had violated that PTD when it granted part of Lake Michigan’s bed for an expansion of a college campus.282 The state legislature had conveyed submerged
276

Id. at 775. The Illinois Supreme Court explained:

The General Assembly passed Senate Bill 782 on June 17, 1963, and it was signed
by the Governor on June 26, 1963. The bill, in essence, provided for the conveyance
by the State of Illinois of 194.6 acres of land submerged in waters of Lake Michigan
to the United States Steel Corporation . . . upon its paying to the State Treasurer
$19,460 and upon the Chicago Park District re-conveying to the State an interest in
the land it had received by certain legislation.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The conveyance of the submerged lands at issue in Illinois Central
was more than one thousand acres, over five times as large. 146 U.S. at 454.
277
Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 775.
278
Id. at 779.
279
Id. at 780. The court explained:
Courts in general have shown great circumspection in considering grants of this
character . . . . It is obvious that Lake Michigan is a valuable natural resource belonging to the people of this State in perpetuity and any attempted ceding of a portion of it in favor of a private interest has to withstand a most critical examination.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
280
Id. (Explaining “there has developed a strong, though belated, interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and improving our physical environment. The public has become
increasingly concerned with dangers to health and life from environmental sources and more sensitive to the value and, frequently, the irreplaceability, of natural resources.”).
281
Id. at 780–81. The court also dismissed the steel company’s defense that the conveyance
of the lakebed would provide public benefits of employment and economic improvement because
those public benefits would be merely “incidental” to the dominant purpose of furthering the steel
company’s interest. Id. at 781 (“Any benefit here to the public would be incidental. We judge that
the direct and dominating purpose here would be a private one.”).
282
Lake Mich. Fed’n, 742 F. Supp. at 442.
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Lake Michigan lands to Loyola University of Chicago (“Loyola” or “the
university”) to fill eighteen-and-a-half acres of lakebed and build an athletic
facility, bike and walking paths, and a lawn.283 The university planned to
grant public access to the latter areas, but only subject to conditions.284 The
court distilled three basic principles from public trust case law:
First, courts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender
valuable public resources to a private entity. Second, the public
trust is violated when the primary purpose of a legislative grant is
to benefit a private interest. Finally, any attempt by the state to relinquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated
under the doctrine.285
Applying these essential principles, the court decided that the grant of the
lakebed to Loyola violated the PTD because the conveyance primarily benefited the university while relinquishing public control over the 18.5 acres
of publicly held lakebed.286 The decision thus prevented private monopolization of public trust lands.
Judicial restraints on alienation of trust resources have also been commonplace in other states. For example, in 1991, in Arizona Center for Law
in the Public Interest v. Hassell, the Arizona Court of Appeals invalidated a
legislative grant of riverbed lands to private landowners.287 A state statute
attempted to relinquish most of the state’s ownership of those lands.288 A
public interest group challenged the statute under the state’s PTD, as well as
a gift clause in the Arizona Constitution restricting governmental disposition of public resources.289 The court relied on both to invalidate the state
grant, explaining that the state must supply a public purpose and obtain fair
consideration to the public before alienating public resources—particularly
public trust resources, which must be managed for present and future gener283

Id. at 443.
Id.
285
Id. at 445 (internal citations omitted).
286
Id. at 445–47.
287
Hassell, 837 P.2d at 174.
288
Id. at 161. The court explained:
284

In 1985, Arizona officials upset longstanding assumptions about title to riverbed
lands by asserting that the state owned all lands in the beds of Arizona watercourses
that were navigable when Arizona was admitted to the Union. The 38th Arizona
Legislature responded by enacting [a 1987 law] substantially relinquishing the
state’s interest in such lands. The validity of that statute is the subject of this appeal.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
289
Id. at 163; see ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (“Neither the State, nor any county, city, town,
municipality, or other subdivision of the State shall ever . . . make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation . . . .”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811969

46

Environmental Affairs

[Vol. 44:1

ations.290 The court declared “the state’s responsibility to administer its watercourse lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood
itself.”291 Consequently, the state had to administer the riverbeds consistent
with public trust purposes.292 Because the legislature had failed to assess the
value of the riverbeds to present and future generations, the court held that
the attempted riverbed conveyance violated the PTD.293
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Clark County in 2011, the Nevada Supreme
Court limited the ability of the state legislature to direct the Colorado River
Commission to transfer lands to a county that included the dry riverbed and
banks of the Colorado River.294 The state’s Land Registrar transferred most
of the land as directed by the legislature but withheld three hundred thirty
acres abutting the Colorado River, much of which was dry, because he believed that the lands remained subject to the state’s PTD.295 The county filed
suit, arguing that because the land was no longer submerged beneath navigable water, it was not subject to the public trust.296 A trial court ruled in
favor of the county, agreeing that the disputed land was not subject to the

290

Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170. The court explained:

The gift clause offers a well-established constitutional framework for judicial review
of an attempted legislative transfer of a portion of the public trust. We hold that
when a court reviews a dispensation of public trust property, as when a court reviews the dispensation of any other property, the two Wistuber elements—public
purpose and fair consideration—must be shown. The gift clause surely requires no
less for public trust property than for other holdings of the state . . . . Yet public trust
land is not like other property. As the Supreme Court said in Illinois Central, a
state’s title to lands under navigable waters is different in character from that which
the state holds in lands intended for sale. The state might sell ordinary property for
fair consideration for the public purpose of enhancing the state fisc. Such a showing,
however, would not suffice to validate a dispensation from the public trust. Because
the state may not dispose of trust resources except for purposes consistent with the
public’s right of use and enjoyment of those resources, any public trust dispensation
must also satisfy the state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and
enjoyment of present and future generations.
Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
291
Id. at 168.
292
Id.; see also id. at 170 (“Because the state may not dispose of trust resources except for
purposes consistent with the public’s right of use and enjoyment of those resources, any public
trust dispensation must also satisfy the state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use
and enjoyment of present and future generations.”).
293
Id. at 172–74 (considering “whether the dispensation satisfies the state’s special obligation
to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations,” and concluding
that “[t]he legislature established no basis to assess the value as a public resource of the parcels
that it relinquished wholesale by its act,” and thus invalidating the law).
294
254 P.3d 606, 609, 617 (Nev. 2011).
295
Id. at 608
296
Id. The registrar filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief, requesting a declaration that
the land “was subject to the public trust doctrine and therefore was not transferable.” Id.
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public trust because it was no longer within the current channel of the Colorado River.297 The registrar appealed.298
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, observing that “a state holds the
banks and beds of navigable waterways in trust for the public and subject to
restraints on alienability.”299 Interpreting both the state constitution and pertinent statutes,300 the court explained that the “public trust doctrine is . . . not
simply common law easily abrogated by legislation; instead, the doctrine
constitutes an inseverable restraint on the state’s sovereign power.”301 The
court therefore remanded the case to the lower court, instructing the court to
determine whether the dry riverbed had been submerged beneath navigable
water at statehood and, if so, whether the conveyance of trust lands was
consistent with the PTD.302
2. Restraints on Alienation in State Constitutions
The PTD is often entrenched in state constitutions, making legislative
evasions difficult. For example, in 1999, building on principles established
297
Id. Although Nevada had never expressly adopted the PTD, the court ruled that the tenets
of the doctrine had been present in Nevada case law for at least forty years. See id. at 609; State v.
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972); State Eng’r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159 (Nev.
1970)).
298
Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 608.
299
Id. at 607.
300
Id. at 612–13; see NEV. CONST., art. VIII, § 9 (“The State shall not donate or loan money,
or its credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corporation, except corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes.”); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 321.0005 (2016) (“the policy of this State regarding the use of state lands to be that state lands
must be used in the best interest of the residents of this State, and to that end the lands may be
used for recreational activities, the production of revenue and other public purposes”); Id.
§ 533.025 (“The water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether
above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.”).
301
Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 613; see also id. (“In sum, although the public trust doctrine has
roots in the common law, it is distinct from other common law principles because it is based on a
policy reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes, and the inherent limitations on the
state’s sovereign power, as recognized by Illinois Central.” (citing Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387
(1892)); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948 (interpreting Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution to
affirm PTD rights as “inherent and indefeasible” components of citizenship (quoting Pap’s A.M.
v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 603 (2002)).
302
Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 616–17. The Nevada Supreme Court found:

Because we find the reasoning enunciated in Hassell persuasive and harmonious
with our own gift clause and public trust jurisprudence, we adopt the Hassell approach to reviewing dispensations of public trust property. Accordingly, when assessing such dispensations, courts of this state must consider (1) whether the dispensation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the state received fair consideration in exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the dispensation satisfies ‘the
state’s special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present
and future generations.’”
Id. (citing and quoting Hassell, 837 P.2d at 170).
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in the 1991 Arizona PTD case, Hassell,303 the Arizona Supreme Court again
invoked the state’s constitutional PTD in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, invalidating a statute that purported
to prohibit courts from considering the PTD in water rights adjudications.304
The San Carlos Apache Tribe challenged the statute that governed rights in
the state’s surface waters, and the trial court upheld the law.305 The tribe
appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court reversed on public trust
grounds,306 announcing:
The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its
people. The Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to these or any proceedings . . . . It is for the
courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to
the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority.307
The court consequently invalidated the statute, reading the PTD’s antimonopoly principle into the state’s constitution.308
In another constitutional PTD decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated parts of a state statute aimed at facilitating natural gas
hydrofracturing (“fracking”) as violative of the PTD in Robinson Township
v. Commonwealth.309 The law, Act 13, prevented local governments from
using land use authority to restrict fracking.310 Several municipalities challenged the law, claiming that fracking significantly harmed the environ-

303

Hassell, 837 P.2d at 158; see supra notes 287–293 and accompanying text (discussing this

case).
304
305

972 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. 1999).
Id. at 186, 199. The Arizona Supreme Court explained:

The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication proceeding held
pursuant to this article [of the Constitution]. In adjudicating the attributes of water
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to whether
public trust values are associated with any or all of the river system or source.
Id. at 199 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-263(B) (1998)).
306
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 927 P.2d at 186.
307
Id. at 199 (citing Hassell, 837 P.2d at 166–68) (internal citation omitted) (applying both
the separation of powers doctrine and the state’s constitutional gift clause).
308
Id. at 202 (invalidating a provision “making the public trust doctrine inapplicable to these
proceedings”).
309
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913. See generally John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings
of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L. 463 (2015) (detailing the significance of Robinson
Twp., 83 A.3d 901, and anticipating the implications of recognizing the PTD in the Pennsylvania
Constitution).
310
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915.
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ment, and thus that Act 13 violated Pennsylvania’s constitutional PTD.311
Although the lower court dismissed the constitutional public trust claims,312
it also ruled that some of the law’s provisions were an unconstitutional violation of substantive due process under the state constitution.313
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court’s ruling
invalidating provisions of Act 13 that preempted local ordinances, but a plurality of the court did so on PTD grounds.314 The plurality decided that Pennsylvania’s constitutional public trust required the state “to prevent degradation, diminution, and depletion of our public natural resources, which it may
satisfy by enacting legislation that adequately restrains actions of private parties likely to cause harm to protected aspects of our environment.”315 Contrary to that public trust directive, the statute’s goals were not to “effectuate
the constitutional goal to protect and preserve Pennsylvania’s natural environment,” but instead to “provide a maximally favorable environment for
industry operators to exploit Pennsylvania’s oil and gas resources . . . .”316
As the plurality explained:

311
Id. at 913, 915–16; see PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania mandates:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
312
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 930.
313
Id. In Pennsylvania, substantive due process requires the legislature to act in the best interest of the larger community and must balance competing concerns within this framework. Id. at
931–32. A concurring opinion endorsed the reasoning of the lower court, agreeing that the statute’s preemption of local laws violated substantive due process by failing to protect the interests
of neighboring property owners and changing the character of neighborhoods based on irrational
classifications. Id. at 1001, 1002–03 (Baer, J. concurring).
314
Id. at 977–82 (plurality opinion).
315
Id. at 979; see also id. at 974 (“The Commonwealth’s obligations as trustee to conserve
and maintain the public natural resources for the benefit of the people, including generations yet to
come, create a right in the people to seek to enforce the obligations.”). The court explained:
As trustee, the Commonwealth is a fiduciary obligated to comply with the terms of
the trust and with standards governing a fiduciary’s conduct. The explicit terms of
the trust require the government to conserve and maintain the corpus of the trust.
The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty to prevent
and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural resources. As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a duty to act toward the corpus of
the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.
Id. at 957 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
316
Id. at 975.
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The public natural resources implicated by the ‘optimal’ accommodation of industry here are resources essential to life, health,
and liberty: surface and ground water, ambient air, and aspects of
the natural environment in which the public has an interest. As the
citizens illustrate, development of the natural gas industry in the
Commonwealth unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and
undeniably detrimental, impact on the quality of these core aspects of Pennsylvania’s environment, which are part of the public
trust. . . .By any responsible account, the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will produce a detrimental effect on the
environment, on the people, their children, and future generations,
and potentially on the public purse. . . .317
Consequently, the court struck down Act 13’s preemption of local zoning
requirements as unconstitutional, although only a plurality thought that the
law had violated the public trust provision in the state constitution.318
The plurality saw the law’s prohibition of new zoning ordinances as inconsistent with the PTD because it prevented local governments from protecting vulnerable trust resources in local neighborhoods.319 Chief Justice Castille
explained that the effect of Act 13 was to impermissibly harm the properties
317

Id. at 975–76. The court elaborated:

The industry uses two techniques that enhance recovery of natural gas from these
“unconventional” gas wells: hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” . . . and horizontal
drilling. Both techniques inevitably do violence to the landscape. Slick-water fracking involves pumping at high pressure into the rock formation a mixture of sand and
freshwater treated with a gel friction reducer, until the rock cracks, resulting in
greater gas mobility. Horizontal drilling requires the drilling of a vertical hole to
5,500 to 6,500 feet—several hundred feet above the target natural gas pocket or reservoir—and then directing the drill bit through an arc until the drilling proceeds
sideways or horizontally. One unconventional gas well in the Marcellus Shale uses
several million gallons of water.
Id. at 914–15
318
Id. at 977–78. The court explained:
The Commonwealth, by the General Assembly, declares in Section 3303 [of Act 13]
that environmental obligations related to the oil and gas industries are of statewide
concern and, on that basis, the Commonwealth purports to preempt the regulatory
field to the exclusion of all local environmental legislation that might be perceived
as affecting oil and gas operations. Act 13 thus commands municipalities to ignore
their [public trust] obligations under Article I, Section 27 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution] and further directs municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo existing protections of the environment in their localities. The police power, broad as it
may be, does not encompass such authority to so fundamentally disrupt these expectations respecting the environment.
Id. The other member of the majority thought Act 13 violated substantive due process. Id. at 1001
(Baer, J., concurring); see Lawrence, 254 P.3d at 609, 617.
319
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 979–82.
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and communities most affected by the environmental hazards associated with
fracking.320 As he declared, “[t]his disparate effect is irreconcilable with the
express command that the trustee will manage the corpus of the [public] trust
for the benefit of ‘all the people.’ A trustee must treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes of the trust.”321 Underlying Robinson Township is
a strong antimonopoly sentiment affirming local community control over privatization of natural gas resources affecting groundwater.
As these decisions illustrate, restraints on government alienation of
public resources, first established in Illinois Central, remain alive and vibrant.322 As in Illinois Central, alienation restraints protect public access to
trust resources, preventing private monopolies that would interfere with
public use.323 They also require public oversight for private uses of trust
resources to ensure against unnecessary degradation that harms the public.
CONCLUSION
The American PTD is rooted in long-held antimonopoly sentiment.
From its inception in U.S. law in the early nineteenth century, the doctrine
has protected the public against state attempts to create private monopolies
over natural resources, beginning with oyster harvesting in tidal waters and
soon extending inland to navigable waters and wildlife.324 In the United
320

Id. at 980–82. In describing Act 13, the court explained:

[The] requirement that local government permit industrial uses in all zoning districts
is that some properties and communities will carry much heavier environmental and
habitability burdens than others . . . . Imposing statewide environmental and habitability standards appropriate for the heaviest of industrial areas in sensitive zoning
districts lowers environmental and habitability protections for affected residents and
property owners below the existing threshold and permits significant degradation of
public natural resources. The outright ban on local regulation of oil and gas operations (such as ordinances seeking to conform development to local conditions) that
would mitigate the effect, meanwhile, propagates serious detrimental and disparate
effects on the corpus of the [public] trust.
Id. at 980–81. Further, the court explained:
In Pennsylvania, terrain and natural conditions frequently differ throughout a municipality, and from municipality to municipality. As a result, the impact on the quality,
quantity, and well-being of our natural resources cannot reasonably be assessed on
the basis of a statewide average. Protection of environmental values, in this respect,
is a quintessential local issue that must be tailored to local conditions.
Id. at 979.
321
Id. at 980 (internal citation omitted).
322
See supra notes 94–116 and accompanying text (discussing this case and its future implications).
323
See supra notes 94–116 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
324
See supra notes 38–92 and accompanying text (discussing early public trust cases that
prevented landowner monopolization of wildlife resources in tidal waters).
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States Supreme Court’s seminal decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the Court held that the PTD prevented the state from sanctioning private monopolization of Chicago Harbor, thus preserving the harbor and
lakefront for present and future public use.325 Ensuing case law invoked the
PTD to combat private threats to other important natural resources, including non-tidal and traditionally non-navigable waters, as well as wildlife and
upland resources like beaches and parklands.326 Courts are now being asked
to consider antimonopoly protection for additional public resources, including groundwater and the atmosphere.327
The PTD found footing in American jurisprudence nearly two centuries ago.328 Although commentators have written extensively about the doctrine’s development and significance,329 the antimonopoly roots of the PTD
have not been closely examined. Public trust advocates seeking to enforce
or expand the scope of the doctrine should ground the PTD in its deep antimonopoly origins, which help to clarify the basis of the widespread sentiment that certain natural resources have public values too significant to be
subject to exclusive private control.330

325

See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
See supra notes 107–257 and accompanying text (reviewing twentieth and twenty-first
century public trust cases that strengthen restraints on alienation of natural resources and expand
protection to various non-traditional resources).
327
See supra 258–273 and accompanying text (discussing the claimed public trust in the atmosphere, which seeks to prevent further climate change).
328
See supra notes 38–92 and accompanying text (reviewing the earliest nineteenth-century
public trust cases).
329
For example, a recent Westlaw search for secondary sources with “public trust” in their
titles yielded 437 results (last searched June 26, 2016).
330
See, e.g., Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893) (“To hand over . . . lakes
to private ownership . . . would be a great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of which
cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.”); see also supra notes 129–139 and accompanying text
(discussing Lamprey).
326

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811969

2017]

The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly Doctrine

53

POSTSCRIPT
On November 10, 2016, the federal District Court for the District of
Oregon refused to dismiss Juliana v. United States, a case brought by twenty-one youth plaintiffs asserting that the federal government violated their
constitutional due process rights to life, liberty, and property, as well as the
government’s duty to manage public resources in trust for the people and
for future generations.331 The government jeopardized these rights, the
youths claimed, by fossil fuel policies that threaten a healthful atmosphere,
thereby threatening human life, causing widespread property damage, and
dramatically altering the earth’s ecosystems.332 By allowing the claim to
proceed, Judge Ann Aiken rejected the government’s claim that the case
represented a non-justiciable political question, upheld the children’s standing to sue, and ruled that the children had stated a valid claim based on the
government’s alleged interference with fundamental due process rights.333
The court also ruled that the government had a PTD duty to protect
trust property, including the territorial seas.334 Because greenhouse gas pollution of the atmosphere produces ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures, it jeopardizes trust resources, including “at a minimum, the territorial seas.”335 Interpreting the PTD as grounded in, and enforceable
through, the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause,336 the court stated, “no
government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”337 Judge
Aiken found a valid PTD claim in the plaintiffs’ assertion that government
“nominally retain[ed] control over trust assets while actually allowing their
depletion and destruction,”338 and applied the PTD to the federal govern-

331
Juliana v. United States, No. 15-ev-01517-TC, 2016 WL 6661146, *2–3 (D. Or. Nov. 10,
2016). The court was cognizant of the importance of the issues before it from the outset. See id. at
*3 (“This is no ordinary lawsuit.”).
332
Id. at *16. Concerning the due process right, the court relied upon the precedents of Roe v.
Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges. Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *15; see Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015) (recognizing a fundamental right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (recognizing a fundamental right to an abortion). The court also located
the fundamental right to a healthy environment in the Ninth Amendment. Juliana, 2016 WL
6661146 at *15.
333
Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *3–9 (discussing the political question), *9–14 (discussing
standing), *14–17 (discussing due process).
334
Id. at *20.
335
Id. at *20–21.
336
Id. at *25 (noting that fundamental rights are those that are implicit in ordered liberty or
deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition (citing McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742,
761, 767 (2010)).
337
Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *18.
338
Id. at *19–21.
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ment.339 Further, she ruled that the PTD was not inconsistent with the Constitution’s Property Clause340 and was not displaced by federal statutes like
the Clean Air and Water Acts.341 The court accurately described the PTD as
one of the “inherent aspects of sovereignty” preserved by but not created by
the Constitution.342
Juliana may also be framed in antimonopoly policy terms.343 The
effect of federal actions and inaction over the decades have created an impermissible atmospheric monopoly enjoyed by fossil-fuel polluters at the
expense of the general public, dependent on the atmosphere for life and a
healthy environment.344 The decision means that the case will proceed to
trial or settlement concerning whether the government’s actions concerning
atmospheric pollution actually violated the children’s due process and PTD
rights.

339
Id. at *23–24 (finding unpersuasive a decision to the contrary in Alec L., 863 F. Supp. at
12, 15 (D.D.C. 2012)). The court explained:

[E]ven though Illinois Central interpreted Illinois law, its central tenets could be applied broadly . . . because it “invoked the principle in American law recognizing the
weighty public interests in submerged lands.” . . . There is no reason why the central
tenets of Illinois Central should apply to another state, but not to the federal government.
Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *44–45 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285
(1997)). See generally Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 3 (arguing that Illinois Central was not
based on Illinois state law).
340
Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *23 (Noting that although Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S.
529, 539 (1976), stated that the Property Clause was “without limitations” the Court did not have
the issue of whether federal authority to manage public lands despite violating “individual constitutional rights or run afoul of public trust obligations.”).
341
Id. at *24 (distinguishing American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424
(2001), which ruled that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law nuisance claims).
342
Id. at *25. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, the “obligation . . . cannot be legislated
away.” Id. at *24; see also id. at *25 (“Governments, in turn, possess certain powers that permit
them to safeguard the rights of the people, these powers are inherent in the authority to govern and
cannot be sold or bargained away.”).
343
See Juliana, 2016 WL 6661146 at *18–19.
344
See id. at *26. Judge Aiken closed by stating that federal courts “have been . . . overly
deferential in the area of environmental law, and the world has suffered for it . . . .” Id. (citing
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for Federal Judges, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 785, 785–86,
788). Judge Goodwin was the author of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, ruling that the doctrine of
custom protected the public’s use of Oregon ocean beaches. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); see Blumm
& Doot, supra note 219, at 407–09. (discussing the Hay decision).
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